Southpaw Saviors?

In my last post, I highlighted the Carl Pavano signing and expressed concern about the state of the Tribe's starting rotation for 2009. While I'm still worried about a pitching staff sans-Sabathia, I think I did a poor job of backing up my opinion. I summed up my thoughts as such:

"No one behind Lee and Carmona can truly be counted on to a.) pitch effectively for most of the season b.) stay healthy or c.) not pitch like a rookie who is in way over his head."

This is a pretty broad statement without much evidence behind it. Amazingly, no one called me on it, but I think these issues warrant further investigation.

What should we expect from Aaron Laffey?

Laffey started the 2008 season in Buffalo as an emergency sixth starter for the Major League club, but was soon called to action after Jake Westbrook suffered a rib injury in mid-April. With Westbrook's subsequent elbow injury (and season-ending surgery) it seemed like Laffey wouldn't be making that long drive to Buffalo anytime soon. Laffey provided the Tribe with an exceptional backup to Westbrook and initially improved on his 2007 debut.

Year	Age	Level	IP (GS)	ERA	WHIP	K/9	BB/9	GB/FB	LD%	Strike%
2007	22	AAA	96.1 (15)	3.08	1.16	7.01	2.15	N/A	N/A	N/A
		MLB	49.1 (9)	4.56	1.34	4.56	2.19	3.32	18.8	62.2
2008	23	AAA	61.2 (11)	4.38	1.46	6.86	2.63	N/A	N/A	N/A
		MLB	93.2 (16)	4.23	1.43	4.13	2.98	1.69	18.7	60.8

With the exception of two forgettable starts against New York (5.2 IP, 4 ER) and at Texas (5 IP, 8 ER), Laffey was very effective in his first 11 starts. The young southpaw averaged 6.23 innings per start with a 2.83 ERA, 1.22 WHIP, 1.57 K/BB, and 1.60 GB/FB ratio over that span. At some point during his final six starts, Laffey started to experience difficulties with his throwing elbow. He got hit harder, surrendered more walks, and lasted fewer innings resulting in a 1.40 point jump in his ERA. After lasting just 3.2 innings in Seattle and getting torched for 8 ER in 4 IP in L.A., Cleveland sent Laffey back to Buffalo to smooth out some wrinkles in his mechanics. It's unclear to what degree, if any, Laffey's elbow was impeding his delivery at this point, but he did not fare much better in Buffalo, posting a 4.38 ERA and 1.46 WHIP in 61.2 total innings in AAA that year. Those last two starts basically trashed Laffey's overall numbers. In his 14 starts before the All Star Break, Laffey had a 3.45 ERA, 1.27 WHIP, and 1.48 K/BB.

Despite struggling with his delivery and/or a strained elbow (again, I can't say for sure), several of Laffey's key peripherals from 2008 were still comparable to 2007. Even with a rough stretch in his final six starts, Laffey's line drive percentage and number of pitches thrown for strikes saw little change from last season. This is important because it shows Laffey's pitches were still fairly effective and batters were not driving his pitches any more than usual.

It's interesting that Laffey threw only 1.4% fewer strikes in 2008, yet his BB/9 rate jumped 0.79 points. The best explanation I can think of for that is that Laffey did not challenge batters to expand the strike zone as often as before. In 2007, a batter may have been more likely to offer at a breaking ball on its way out of the zone resulting in a ground or foul ball (both tallied as strikes), rather than a called ball. This theory is encouraged by a 6.4% drop in O-Swing%, or the amount of time a batter swung at a pitch outside the strike zone.

With all the reports of Laffey's delivery needing some work last season, it seems pretty likely that his pitches were not experiencing the same movement as before. If Laffey was unable to drive his breaking ball through the desired trajectory on a consistent basis, this could explain why his walk rate went up and his pitches failed to fool as many batters. Flatter or more erratic pitches could also lead to fewer fooled batters flailing into groundball outs, at least partly explaining the steep drop in GB/FB ratio. I'm fairly confident that any issues Laffey had with his pitches were directly related to his strained elbow. One good sign amidst Laffey's control issues was that his pitch velocity saw only negligible changes between the two seasons.

The key to Laffey's success is his ability to induce groundball outs. The only variables that changed since 2007 were the health of Laffey's elbow, his command, and his groundball production. Laffey's pitch selection, velocity, and strategy basically stayed the same. The fact that a specific, integral variable (the elbow) can be traced back to the other two troublesome variables is encouraging.

It's easy to forget just how few consecutive innings Laffey has logged in the Majors when it feels like (at least to me) he's been such a steady contributor to the team since their playoff run in 2007. Even though his experience and talent give him an edge over his contemporaries, Laffey has still not been guaranteed a spot in the rotation heading into Spring Training (Shapiro has hinted that Laffey is the frontrunner for the job, so this may just be to further competition amongst the lesser candidates). There is still some question as to how Laffey will perform over the course of an entire Major League season. This is certainly a valid point, since no amount of projections or speculation can truly predict how a 23-year old pitcher coming off an injury will perform over 170+ innings. That said, I still feel there's a strong chance Laffey will continue to improve on his two partial seasons.

The issues outlined above are unlikely to follow Laffey into 2009, especially since his delivery issues were caught and corrected early. Cleveland was wise to shut-down Laffey as soon as the elbow strain was diagnosed and has carefully monitored his performance since then. If Laffey's control reverts back to its 2007 form, his walk and groundball rates should go back to normal which will make him much more effective than he has been lately. I don't see any reason why this won't happen next season if Laffey is 100% healthy. I'm not sure if this will be Laffey's breakout season, but I do think he will establish himself as a full-time starter in the Majors. If I were to choose which fourth or fifth starter will go on to log the most innings this season, I would take Laffey over Pavano, Huff, Sowers, and Lewis.

Does Huff have the tools to succeed out of the gate?

Former first-round draft pick, David Huff, is expected to be a strong contender for the final rotation spot out of Spring Training. Huff pitched collegiate ball for two years at UCLA before signing with the Indians in 2006. The California native encountered little resistance in the lower minors and found himself in Buffalo in a little over two seasons. Huff's 2007 season with Kinston was shortened because of a strained ligament in his throwing elbow, but he suffered no ill effects from the elbow in 2008. Below are Huff's stats from the past two seasons:

Year	Age	Level	IP (GS)	ERA	WHIP	K/9	BB/9	K/BB	BABIP	FIP
2007	22	A+	59.2 (11)	2.72	1.21	6.94	2.26	3.07	.302	3.33
2008	23	AA	65.2 (10)	1.92	0.88	8.50	1.92	4.43	.240	2.99
		AAA	80.2 (16)	3.01	1.03	9.04	1.67	5.40	.291	3.15

I really can't find anything to complain about here. Huff must have had great coaches and preparation at UCLA because he hit the ground running in his first full minor league season and never looked back. His strikeout and walk rates improved significantly at each development level, despite having to make the transition from AA to AAA mid-season. In 213.2 career minor league innings, Huff compiled an outstanding 2.70 ERA and 1.07 WHIP. Huff's numbers hold up well on their own, too. When team defense is removed from the equation with FIP, Huff would still have averaged a 3.15 ERA.

Even when Huff appeared to be at risk of stumbling in his first season back from the elbow injury, his talent proved otherwise. A .240 BABIP, like Huff had in 65 innings at AA, would normally indicate a pitcher is playing over his head. Instead, Huff improved across the board after his promotion to AAA, raising his BABIP to a more sustainable .291 in the process. Obviously, that last hurdle between AAA and the Majors is the biggest, but Huff seems as prepared as anyone to make a successful transition.

Despite having just over 200 innings of professional experience, Huff's maturity as a pitcher shines through in his performance. Tony Lastoria describes Huff's abilities:

"Huff is a strike-thrower who has excellent command of his pitches. His fastball consistently clocks in at 88-91 MPH, and his changeup is a plus pitch and ranked one of the best in the country coming into the draft. While he does not overpower hitters, he has unbelievable confidence in his fastball, and commands it well working it to both sides of the plate and to the corners on all four quadrants. He has the best fastball command in the entire system, and is a very polished pitcher. He is aggressive and attacks hitters, and he has a great, athletic delivery which deceives hitters and he repeats it well.

The key to Huff's future will be the development of an effective breaking ball as a third pitch to use against left-handers. He does throw a curveball, but it still needs a lot of work, and his slider is just average."

Huff's lack of a go-to breaking pitch may prove to be a challenge once he starts to face Major League hitting, but those pitches should have improved considerably by the time Spring Training starts (the scouting report I quoted is over a year old at this point). One trait that should serve Huff well in his rookie season is his ability to aggressively attack hitters in all parts of the strike zone.

At first, Huff reminded me of another left-hander who relies heavily on control. Jeremy Sowers' career mirrors Huff's in several ways. Both pitched in college, cruised through the minors, and were primed for their MLB debut by age 23 (assuming Huff joins the team this year). Sowers' career minor league stats are also similar (414 IP, 2.50 ERA, 1.17 WHIP, 8.4 H9, 2.2 BB9, 6.7 K9), except Sowers was never the strikeout pitcher that Huff is. Leading up to his MLB debut, Sowers saw his strikeout rate decline at least a full point at each development level, settling in at 5.0 K/9 over 97.1 IP in 2006. Sowers was able to raise his K rate in two Buffalo stints in 2007 and 2008 to 5.7 and 6.4 respectively, but never duplicated that success in the Majors. Huff followed the opposite path, elevating his K rate by 2.10 points between A+ and AAA.

Also, if Huff's fastball range of 88-91 MPH sounds like something typically associated with "crafty" lefties, it's worth noting that Cliff Lee averaged just 90.5 MPH with his fastball last season. An 89 MPH average doesn't seem so bad for a pitcher who actually has the ability and the guts to challenge hitters on all parts of the plate.

If Huff's strikeout rate distinguishes him from Sowers, how does he compare to past pitching prospects? Below are the career minor league stats for two other left-handed pitchers who eventually stuck in the Majors:

Player	IP	ERA	WHIP	H9	HR9	BB9	K9
C. Lee	427.1	3.37	1.27	7.2	0.8	4.2	10.2
C.C. Sabathia	246.2	3.44	1.30	7.3	0.5	4.4	10.4
D. Huff	213.2	2.70	1.07	7.5	0.7	2.2	8.3

It's interesting to note how Lee and Sabathia made up for a lack of control with high K rates, while Huff had significantly better control with a lower, yet still strong, K rate. This may not mean anything at all, but it's fun to look at.

As far as I'm concerned, Huff doesn't have much left to prove in the minors. It's possible that Sowers will get one last shot at the Majors before the team makes a final decision on him, but it looks like the next wave of prospects has finally caught up to Sowers. Considering Cleveland's fourth starter is Carl "anecdotal adjective" Pavano, they'll need all the pitching depth they can get. However, unless Pavano crashes his Ferrari into the foul pole at Goodyear or something, Huff is a long-shot for the final rotation spot (I'll be surprised if Laffey doesn't get it). The good news is that as soon as Pavano inevitably implodes, the team can simply eat his meager salary and plug in Huff. Until then, Huff will probably be this season's emergency starter in Columbus.

Pavano Adds Cheap Depth to Tribe Rotation

I had a hunch Cleveland was going to make at least one more signing with whatever meager funds the front office could scrape together. Fortunately, the final signing was prefaced by the general manager stating “the lion's share of our resources have been committed,” so I knew not to get my hopes up. Still, Shapiro is one of the best around at identifying low risk, high reward players, stretching every available dollar, so something had to be up. Who will Shap’s rehab project be in 2009?

Cleveland fans, meet your new left fielder…..Sammy Sosa!

No, just kidding (sorry to anyone who just did a spit-take onto their monitor). Seriously though, Carl Pavano? I know the front office is basically broke at this point, but if we had a significant hole to fill couldn’t we have traded for someone? Please? Oh well, I guess Scott Boras doesn’t accept coupons.

Obviously, I’m not thrilled with this signing, partly because it’s such a crap shoot as to whether Pavano will be effective enough to justify even using him in the rotation. The last time King Carl (apparently this is the moniker Yankee fans bestowed upon him, very distinguished) made at least ten starts in the Major Leagues was when he managed to toss 100 innings over 17 starts with a 4.77 ERA and 1.47 WHIP in 2005. That was by far the most productive season New York wrung out of Pavano during his four year, $38 million contract (your turn, Burnett). Here is Pavano’s body of work over four seasons with New York, not including his minor league rehab starts:

Year	GS	IP	ERA	WHIP	K/BB	HR/9	GB/FB
2005	17	100.0	4.77	1.47	3.11	1.53	1.59
2006	DID NOT PITCH
2007	2	11.1	4.76	1.24	2.00	0.79	1.29
2008	7	34.1	5.77	1.49	1.50	1.31	0.96

I’m not sure why I bothered to add any extra peripherals to the table, since the sample size is either too small or nonexistent for the past three seasons. I’d say the lack of substantial innings from 2006 to 2008 sums up Pavano’s performance as well as anything. Despite enduring a stretch that would have ended the career of most pitchers, Pavano managed to get healthy enough to net a new contract. It seems like Pavano’s mini-comeback over seven starts from August 23 to September 25 played heavily into Shapiro’s decision to choose him over the likes of Mark Mulder, Bartolo Colon, and Freddy Garcia.

Mulder is still trying to get healthy (1.7 IP in 2008) and has struggled with his health just as much as Pavano lately. Colon gave Boston some solid emergency starts, but was back in the minors rehabbing by mid-June. I watched Garcia’s September start against Chicago and his pitches did not look Major League ready, even after rehab. In terms of cheap starting pitchers returning from injuries, Pavano really was the best bet.

Shapiro provided his take on Pavano’s recent activity in an interview on the team’s website:

"This is not a guy you're guessing is going to come back. He made seven starts [in August and September] last year, with no problems. He's in great shape right now. He's strong, fit and highly motivated."

I can understand the potential Shapiro saw based on those seven starts. Again, small sample size, but let’s take a closer look at those starts for lack of better information:

Team	IP	ER	H	BB	HR	K	Strike %	GB/FB
at BAL	5.0	3	7	1	0	5	59.3	2.25
TOR	6.0	1	3	1	0	1	58.3	0.3
at TBR	4.0	3	1	2	1	1	59.4	0.62
at LAA	5.1	5	6	1	2	2	62.1	0.87
TBR	5.1	3	5	2	1	3	61.0	1.42
BAL	5.0	2	6	1	0	2	64.3	1.28
at TOR	3.2	5	8	2	1	1	59.4	1.66

Pavano’s best and only quality start came against Toronto when he posted 1 ER, 3 H, 1 BB, and 1 K over 6 innings. He did manage to provide at least five innings of work in five of the seven starts, but with mixed results. Pavano’s numbers indicate a pretty bland performance, averaging 10.7 hits and 2.6 walks per nine innings with an ERA of 5.77. His other peripherals are much more interesting though.

Even though he averaged over a hit per inning, Pavano improved the percent of pitches he threw for strikes over his first six starts (59.3% to 64.3%). The fact that Pavano was not afraid to attack the zone and stuck to his game plan suggests he at least has some confidence back. Second, according to FanGraphs, Pavano’s O-Swing % of 27.0% (percent of pitches a batter swings at outside the strike zone) and F-Strike % of 55.8% (percent of first pitches thrown for a strike) are stronger than they were in his 2005 season with New York.

Again, the F-Strike % suggests Pavano is willing to be aggressive and attack hitters; good news for a pitcher who tends to rely on location and control to get outs. Unfortunately there isn’t any Pitch f/x data available for Pavano (too few pitches), but if he’s causing batters to swing at his pitches outside the zone at a fair clip I think it’s safe to assume his pitches have some decent life. If Pavano has re-worked his stuff to the point that he can fool batters consistently again, his lack of velocity becomes less of a concern (for comparison, Pavano’s average fastball velocity of 87.9 MPH is over 2 mph faster than Paul Byrd’s).

The renewed life on Pavano’s pitches and his aggressive nature are probably what Shapiro was referring to when he cited those seven starts. Shapiro also has a point in citing Pavano’s motivation to succeed in 2009. If this guy has any pride at all (athletes at this level usually do), he’ll be working his butt off to prove everyone (especially New York) wrong. The tools to achieve modest success are there, but Pavano’s health is going to have the final say no matter what.

Performance aside, I really can’t argue with the way Pavano’s contract is structured. Pavano’s one year contract guarantees him $1.5 million with another $5.3 million locked up in performance incentives. His incentives package is broken down by starts and innings, as described by Cot’s:

Starts: $0.1M each for 18, 20, 22; $0.2M each for 26, 28; $0.25M for 30; $0.3M for 32; $0.35M each for 33, 34; $0.4M for 35

Innings: $0.1M each for 130, 140, 150; $0.15M each for 160, 170; $0.2M for 180; $0.25M each for 190, 200, 210; $0.3M for 215; $0.4M for 225; $0.5M for 235

An easier way of reading it is if Pavano starts 20 games and averages 6 innings per start, he will earn an extra $0.1 million. If he were to average 6.5 innings over the same 20 starts, he’d earn just $0.2 million. Thirty starts (!) at 5.5 innings per and he’d earn $1.2 million in incentives.

Even if Pavano exceeds all expectations and starts 20 games for Cleveland, they’ll only be paying him about $1.6 million for his services. There’s a remote chance Pavano makes even 10-15 starts this season, but if there’s any chance that Cleveland could get some quality innings out of Pavano then it’s worth betting the $1.5 mil to see what happens. Many fans are comparing Pavano’s deal to the one-year contract Kevin Millwood had in 2005, but I don’t see much similarity beyond the structure of their contracts.

Millwood was guaranteed $3 million with up to $4 million in incentives, most of which focused on his ability to stay healthy (he would have lost money for each day spent on the DL). Millwood more than earned his keep that year by posting a 2.86 ERA, 1.21 WHIP, and 2.80 K/BB ratio over 192 IP. In addition to mentoring Sabathia and Lee on the finer points of pitching, Millwood finished sixth in AL Cy Young voting and won the AL ERA title. Plus, Millwood had averaged 34.5 starts, 219.5 IP, and a 114 ERA+ from 2002-2003 before succumbing to injury in 2004 and had a more reliable track record than Pavano ever did.

Cleveland is taking a shot in the dark with Pavano, since no one can draw any kind of reasonable conclusion as to whether he’ll be effective or healthy enough to even hold down a spot in the rotation. Shapiro has gone on record saying if Pavano is healthy, he will be guaranteed a spot in the rotation on Opening Day. What type of pitcher will show up in April is anybody’s guess, but I’m hoping for at least $1 million worth of quality innings until Westbrook is 100% healthy again. I have a feeling the Indians aren’t hoping for much more than that either. I suppose if Pavano can’t make it until July (Westbrook’s projected return), Plan B would be to see if one of the plethora of rookies sticks as a temporary starter.

I still have an uneasy feeling about Cleveland’s rotation, not unlike how I felt when Borowski was designated closer at the beginning of last season. There are just too many “ifs” involved right now. Lee can’t be expected to carry the rotation on his back all season, even after an outstanding Cy Young campaign. If anything, Cleveland should be vigilant about Lee’s workload and pitch action after he threw a career high 223.3 innings (Lee is also aware of this issue, ensuring extra training/recovery time by skipping the WBC).

Meanwhile, the 24-year old Carmona spent most of 2008 trying to get back on track after enduring a hangover from the 215 innings he logged in his sophomore season. I feel that Carmona’s ability to return to form is the key to Cleveland’s rotation this season, even more so than Lee. There’s little reason to think Lee won’t live up to his ace status with another strong season (even with the typical regression), but there is a lot of pressure on Carmona to bounce back and be a legitimate number two starter.

I really like Anthony Reyes’ upside, but he started just six games with Cleveland after a couple of rough seasons in St. Louis. Six starts is not a lot to go on, so it seems Cleveland is banking on his potential to breakout at age 26 in his new surroundings.

Aaron Laffey (93.7 IP, 105 ERA+) and Jeremy Sowers (121 IP, 80 ERA+) both struggled in Cleveland last season, although Sowers did bounce back in Buffalo with a 2.08 ERA, 1.20 WHIP, and 2.52 K/BB ratio over 60.2 innings (when has he not bounced back in Buffalo though?). Scott Lewis (4 GS, 24 IP) and Zach Jackson (16 GS, 92 IP) have limited experience as ML starters. Twenty three year old David Huff rounds out the group of young southpaws with a strong 2008 season in AAA, but no ML experience. There are no signs of Cleveland deviating from their plan to convert Adam Miller into a full-time bullpen arm, so he won’t be available as a starter in 2009.

I realize the five pitchers I just named are mostly under consideration for one rotation spot, although I would consider Pavano’s spot wide open as well. My point is that no one behind Lee and Carmona can truly be counted on to a.) pitch effectively for most of the season b.) stay healthy or c.) not pitch like a rookie who is in way over his head. Maybe I’m just being paranoid about the Tribe’s pitching after having to suffer through the heinous nightmare that was the 2008 bullpen. In my pessimistic opinion though, the starting rotation could be this year’s Achilles heel.

Fun Fact:

After the C.C. Sabathia trade on July 7, Cleveland finished the season with a 44-30 record (.594 WP), including a 10 game winning streak from August 17-27. A .594 WP on the season would have qualified for the AL wild card.

Heavyweight Bout for the AL CY

Raise your hand if you predicted Cliff Lee would be a front runner for the Cy Young Award this season (put your hand down Steve Phillips, I said this season). That’s ok, nobody else did either. As incredible as it may seem, Cleveland’s remaining ace spent half of 2007 in Buffalo and had to fight for his spot on the roster out of spring training. Now, Mr. Lee is locked in a tight race with Doc Halladay for the AL Cy Young Award. Quite a turn-around, all things considered.

Lee and Halladay each have six starts remaining as of August 22, so there’s plenty of time for one of them to pull away. There’s also the chance that they will fall back to the pack, which features a few flashy albeit distant contenders who may catch the voters’ eyes.

I’m putting my money on either Lee or Halladay to win, but who will the BBWA voters favor in a close race? To try and answer that, I decided to look at the last ten CYA winners. I also compared the frontrunners to the rest of the field to see if there are any sleepers for the award. Finally, I compared Lee and Halladay directly in an attempt to find any chinks in their armor, as viewed by the voters (you may be thinking, this is an awful lot of work for something that will be fact in a couple months, which is true. Seriously though, where’s the fun in waiting?).

What’s the benchmark for the CYA?

The Baseball Writers of America are a notoriously picky bunch when it comes to voting for awards. The MVP award seems to have more controversy surrounding it each year than the Cy Young does, but there are some questionable trends that come into play for the CY as well. I’ll include less traditional stats later, but I wanted to focus on the voters’ tendencies to get a feel for what matters the most on the final ballot.

The strangest trend is how much weight the voters seem to put towards a pitcher’s win-loss record and his team’s overall record. Chances are, if you still think these two stats carry an equivalent value to ERA and strikeout rates then I doubt I’ll be able to convince you otherwise. Trying to determine the impact a starting pitcher has had over the course of the season and the context of those contributions can be helpful in determining how valuable the pitcher is, but only if put in the proper context. The win-loss argument is about as tired as it gets though, so I’ll be brief.

A pitcher’s record tends to be a direct reflection of how good the rest of the team is, specifically the bullpen, offense, and defense. The pitcher has little to no control over any of these factors (I suppose you could argue a groundball pitcher affects the defense and an innings-eater keeps a faulty pen off the mound, but in general, the pitcher has no say in the matter), yet they all directly impact the pitcher’s win-loss record. On the other hand, a pitcher can be made to look a lot better than he is if he has a superior defense or above average run support helping him suppress his ERA or rack up wins.

Looking at the past 10 AL Cy Young winners, you can compile a benchmark that voters will likely compare this year’s contenders to. The last ten winners posted an average line of 231 IP, 2.80 ERA, 1.04 WHIP, and 234 K. No pitcher had fewer than 18 wins or less than a .525 team win percentage. Even more exclusive was the fact that only three winners were on teams that did not make the playoffs.

Cy Young Award Winners 2007-1998

Player	Year	Team (WP)	W-L	IP	ERA	WHIP	K	1st Place Votes^
C.C. Sabathia	2007	CLE (.593)	19-7	241	3.21	1.14	209	19
J. Santana	2006	MIN (.593)	19-6	234	2.77	1.00	245	28
B. Colon	2005	LAA (.586)	21-8	223	3.48	1.16	157	17
J. Santana	2004	MIN (.568)	20-6	228	2.61	0.92	265	28
R. Halladay	2003	TOR (.531)*	22-7	266	3.25	1.07	204	26
B. Zito	2002	OAK (.636)	23-5	229	2.75	1.13	182	17
R. Clemens	2001	NYY (.594)	20-3	220	3.51	1.26	213	21
P. Martinez	2000	BOS (.525)*	18-6	217	1.74	0.74	284	28
P. Martinez	1999	BOS (.580)	23-4	213	2.07	0.92	313	28
R. Clemens	1998	TOR (.543)*	20-6	235	2.65	1.10	271	28
	Average:	.575	20-6	231	2.80	1.04	234

*Team did not reach playoffs

^Out of 28 possible votes

Actually, the only pitcher in the past 10 years to have just 18 wins and a team WP below .530 on a non-playoff team was Pedro Martinez in 2000. The rest of Pedro’s stats were just so ridiculous (217 IP, 1.74 ERA, .92 WHIP, 284 K), that it’s probably more realistic to expect no fewer than 19 wins and for the pitcher to be on a strong playoff contender (I didn’t say it made sense, that’s just what past stats say).

The Field

So besides Mr. Lee and Doc Halladay (more on them later), is anyone else close to meeting the criteria of a CY winner? Ehhh, not so much.

CY Contenders as of 8/22/08

Player	Team (WP)	W-L	IP	ERA	WHIP	K	K/BB
D. Matsuzaka	BOS (.579)	15-2	126.2	2.77	1.37	109	1.42
F. Hernandez	SEA (.368)	7-8	151.0	3.04	1.34	140	2.30
J. Danks	CHW (.576)	10-5	150.3	3.05	1.20	130	2.89
J. Saunders	ANA (.613)	14-5	157.7	3.14	1.19	78	1.70
J. Guthrie	BAL (.480)	10-9	177.0	3.15	1.16	110	2.20
J. Lester	BOS (.579)	12-4	167.7	3.17	1.28	114	2.24
M. Mussina	NYY (.528)	16-7	153.3	3.35	1.20	109	5.19

I initially ranked pitchers by their season ERA, K/9, and VORP on Baseball Prospectus’ stat sorting list, just to figure out a rough list of candidates. Guys like Felix Hernandez, John Danks, Jeremy Guthrie, and Jon Lester looked like stiff competition before their lack of wins and innings pitched were factored in.

I was surprised to see what an excellent season Felix Hernandez is having with a 3.04 ERA and 140 K. If it weren’t for his fragility and the fact that he’s on a terrible, West Coast team, Hernandez’s performance would have garnered him more attention. Lester and Guthrie were two more guys who are having solid seasons, but their lack of strikeouts (112 and 110 respectively) and wins (12 and 10) leaves them out of the CY conversation.

Once you move past the mid-tier pitchers, there are only three starters comparable to Lee and Doc in wins and ERA. Saunders is tempting at first glance, but considering his lack of Ks (78) and name recognition (the average voter would probably be more inclined to vote for John Lackey over Saunders, even though Lackey missed a large chunk of the season) his chances are nil. It’s easy to be overshadowed on a contender like Anaheim when the rest of the rotation is so good (also see Carmona, Fausto; 2007).

I’ve heard various media outlets toss Matsuzaka and Mussina into the CY conversation, which is odd considering neither of them can hang with the frontrunners. Mussina may reach 20 wins thanks to a hefty 5.31 runs of support per start, but even that’s the only category where Moose has a shot. Mussina would have to finish extremely strong in September (not unprecedented, he has a career 2.84 ERA in Sept.), but I don’t think he has the stamina to catch up in any other categories.

As for Matsuzaka, I think his 1.42 K/BB ratio and below-average .264 BAbip speak pretty loudly. Like Mussina, he’s got the wins, the contending team, and the hype, but I bet his ERA ends up closer to 3.77 than 2.77 by the time the season’s over.

The Frontrunners

Barring an epic collapse in their final six starts, Cliff Lee and Roy Halladay seem to be alone in the AL CY race. Both pitchers have impressive resumes this season, but each goes about it in a different way.

Halladay is typically more of a groundball pitcher (57.2 GB%), allowing him to get fast outs, conserve pitches, and go deeper into games. Halladay’s strikeout rates have always been healthy, but he has reached 160 Ks only twice in his career. This makes his current combination of a 7.64 K/9 rate (168 K total) and 53.6% groundball rate particularly impressive.

The last time Halladay combined these two strengths in a healthy season was 2003, the last time he won the Cy Young (204 K, 58.4 GB%).

Lee has traditionally relied on flyball outs with decent strikeout rates, but like Halladay, has greatly improved upon his previous trends. By improving the quality of his pitches and approach, Lee has done a better job of keeping hitters off-balance than in the past. The fact that he can precisely locate his fastball and nasty curveball for a strike has also made hitters more inclined to swing at Lee’s pitch in an attempt to put the ball in play. This refined approach has led to a career high in groundball to flyball outs (1.34 2008, .83 career), thus leading to a career low in homeruns surrendered (.41 HR/9).

Obviously, more strikeouts and groundballs will lead to shorter innings (fewer baserunners, more double plays) and is a big reason why Lee has already matched his career total for complete games this season with three.

Lee vs. Halladay as of 8/22/08

Player	Team (WP)	W-L	IP	ERA	WHIP	K	K/BB
C. Lee	CLE (.460)	18-2	177.7	2.43	1.08	141	5.42
R. Halladay	TOR (.520)	15-9	198.0	2.68	1.04	168	4.94

The two frontrunners seem very close at first glance with Lee holding more wins and Halladay more innings and strikeouts. Lee currently leads the AL in ERA, K/BB ratio (5.42), wins, and win percentage (.900). Halladay is first in the AL in IP and complete games, second in WHIP and strikeouts, and third in K/BB ratio (4.94).

I wouldn’t be surprised if Lee and Halladay stay as close as they are now statistically, which means the two major points of contention will be wins and quality/quantity of innings.

If I had to choose between two similar pitchers, I would tend to go for the guy who will give me more quality innings (in this case, Halladay). First, I’d like to peel back a few more layers before definitively choosing anyone here.

Alternative Stats for Lee vs. Halladay as of 8/22/08

Player	CG	SHO	ERA+	FIP	Lead or Tie Blown	RS per Start	OPP QUAL OPS
C. Lee	3	1	180	2.63	5	5.24	.725
R. Halladay	8	2	158	3.09	2	4.25	.762

If you remove team defense from the equation, Lee has actually pitched much better than Halladay in terms of FIP. Lee posted a 2.63 FIP, despite having the fifth worst team defense in the AL in terms of defensive efficiency (.694). Halladay’s FIP of 3.09 indicates the groundball-heavy pitcher’s stats would be a bit worse if it weren’t for the All Star defense playing behind him. Toronto owns the third best defensive efficiency in the AL at .709.

Lee has also had to dodge bullets from his own bullpen, watching five potential wins go to waste after he left the game. Cleveland’s relief pitching has been the ultimate oxymoron this season with a 5.29 ERA. The fact that Toronto has a sparkling 2.98 bullpen ERA would be more of a factor if it weren’t for the eight games that Halladay finished himself this season. Granted, Lee may have incurred more losses by pitching deeper into games, but if Lee had even two of those decisions back he would already be at 20 wins with six starts to go.

Halladay earns some points by getting a full run less from his offense than Lee per start. Halladay also had to face a slightly tougher collection of hitters this season with a .762 opposition OPS to Lee’s .725. Still, Cleveland’s leaky bullpen closes the gap on the run support argument, in my opinion.

Finally, if you compare each pitcher’s ERA+ (adjusted for ballpark factors and measured against the league average; 100 indicates an average pitcher), Lee is 22 points ahead of Halladay (a sizeable margin). The first thing I thought of to explain this was that Halladay plays in the cavernous Rogers Centre with a superior defense. Odds are, a lot of potential hits are stolen in that ballpark, thus aiding Halladay’s numbers.

Taking into account adjusted stats like FIP and ERA+, it would appear that the quality of Lee’s innings partially negates or surpasses Halladay’s quantity. Combine that with Lee’s lead in the all-important (to the voters anyway) wins and traditional ERA and I think Lee has enough of a buffer from Halladay to take home the CY this year.

Where does K-Rod fit in?

Don’t worry, I didn’t forget about all the buzz surrounding Anaheim’s ace reliever. Personally, I’m not a fan of giving the CY to a closer. The disparity between innings compared to starters and the fact that the save tends to be the main benchmark for evaluating closers (basically a win in reverse, it mostly depends on who’s played before you to set up the opportunity) are my two main points of contention on the matter. The CY has been awarded to a closer 10 times between both leagues though, so it still deserves a look.

K-Rod’s claim to fame in 2008 has been his chase of Bobby Thigpen’s record of 57 saves in a season for the 1990 Chi Sox. Thigpen received just two first-place votes for the CY that year with Dave Stewart, Roger Clemens, and Bob Welch all receiving more votes than him. Since there’s only one record, how do K-Rod’s other stats compare to past CY winners out of the pen?

Past CY Winning Closers vs. Rodriguez Through 8/22/08

Player	Team	Year	W-L	SV	IP	ERA	K	WHIP	1st Place Votes^
F. Rodriguez	LAA	2008	2-2	48	53.3	2.70	58	1.37	N/A
E. Gagne	LAD	2003	2-3	55	82.3	1.20	137	.692	28
D. Eckersley	OAK	1992	7-1	51	80.0	1.91	93	.913	19
M. Davis	SDP	1989	4-3	44	92.7	1.85	92	1.04	19
S. Bedrosian	PHI	1987	5-3	40	89.0	2.83	74	1.20	9
W. Hernandez	DET	1984	9-3	32	140.3	1.92	112	.941	12

While Rodriguez is having a very good season, he’s not even close to the dominance shown by previous CY closers. K-Rod has just allowed more baserunners and runs period, as shown by his ERA and WHIP. Only one of the five previous winners had an ERA above 2.00 and no one had a WHIP above 1.20, while K-Rod currently has both.

If the race between Lee and Halladay comes down to the wire I don’t see many first place votes trickling down to Rodriguez.

All stats courtesy of Baseball Reference, Baseball Prospectus, and FanGraphs.

Finally…

I owe Cliff Lee an apology.

Lee posted a 6.29 ERA in 16 starts before being sent to Buffalo to finish out the remainder of the 2007 season. As if that wasn’t bad enough, Lee didn’t do himself any favors in mocking a booing throng of Jacobs Field fans before exiting from his final start in Cleveland that season. The air of apathy and apparent lack of respect for the fans and his teammates (there was a definite tension between Victor and Cliff back then) caused me to balk at the thought of Lee ever pitching in Cleveland again.

Where was the work ethic and focus that had accompanied Lee in his breakout 2005 season?

Lee ended up digging himself a hole he could not escape in 2007, but looking back on that season, I can’t say I blame him. It’s hard enough to maintain the intense focus and physical abilities needed to pitch at an elite level, but Lee also had to cope with his young son’s illness over the course of the season. I honestly can’t imagine the level of frustration he must have felt as the season wore on. Combine that with a nagging abdominal injury suffered in spring training and the pressure to hold down his spot in the rotation and it’s easy to see why the season snowballed on Cliff.

Sometimes fans get so caught up in the game that they forget the guys on the field have lives to deal with off the field as well; I’m certainly guilty of this at times.

Lee proved all the doubters wrong in 2008, coming into spring training relaxed, healthy, and motivated to win. To come back from such a terrible season, half of which was spent in the minor leagues, and evolve into one of the best pitchers in baseball in less than a year is an amazing achievement. While no one expected Lee to contend for the Cy Young in 2008, I have been especially hard on him. So, proving once again, I really have no idea what I’m talking about half the time.

Congratulations on the turn-around Cliff, you earned it.

Jackson Makes Latest Coffee Run for Tribe

Zach Jackson became the first player from the C.C. Sabathia trade to appear in Cleveland. Jackson was called up from Buffalo to fill in for Paul Byrd’s scheduled start on Thursday against Baltimore. Jackson matched opposing pitcher Daniel Cabrera in his Cleveland debut, scattering 8 hits, 1 BB, and 3 ER over five innings for a no-decision.

Considering the context of his first start for the Tribe, I thought Jackson threw the ball well enough. Jackson had been having a tough year in the minors with Milwaukee (7.85 ERA, 1.73 WHIP, 1.88 K/BB ratio in 57.1 IP), but to be traded and have to pitch in the majors again so soon probably didn’t help the young southpaws’ nerves any.

This post is just meant to get a feel for how Jackson tends to operate, but I don’t think we even saw an accurate picture of how Jackson normally takes the mound. If you missed the game, trust me, he seemed really nervous the first few innings.

As a result, his pitches were all over the place. Jackson did manage to throw over 60% of his 97 pitches for strikes, but he was constantly working from behind and had a hard time fooling many batters. Jackson threw a first-pitch strike to 16 of the 25 batters he faced (64%) and had to deal with at least one runner in scoring position in four of his five innings.

Jackson has a typical fastball-changeup combination with the occasional curveball thrown in. According to FanGraphs, Jackson uses a standard fastball 59.6% of the time, averaging 88.6 MPH. His 85.9 MPH cutter and 80.9 MPH change appear 27.2% and 8.2% of the time, respectively. A slider (4.3%, 80.3 MPH) and curve (0.7%, 73.8) round out the lefties arsenal (the sample is small, but Jackson seems to be using his curveball more and cutter much less in 2008).

Since Jackson has spent the majority of his time in the minors and I’ve only seen him pitch once with questionable control, it’s difficult to get a read on what his pitch movement is right now.

Despite laying the groundwork for a potentially ugly start, Jackson did a good job of hanging in there and getting some timely outs in the air and on the ground. Jackson also had to work around a rare error by Cabrera and what should have been an error when Sizemore and Choo lost a flyball in the hazy, evening sky (resulting in the tying run). Considering Jackson would have handed the bullpen the lead after 5 IP, he earned himself another start next week.

Like I said earlier, Cleveland is merely looking at where Jackson and company will fit into the organizational depth chart for 2009. Jackson has a lot of competition for that last starting slot behind Laffey and I don’t think he’ll be in consideration for it anytime soon. Despite signs of improvement in Buffalo (4.05 ERA, 1.13 WHIP, 4.00 K/BB ratio in 26.2 IP), Jackson’s career minor league line of 4.60 ERA, 1.43 WHIP, 2.10 K/BB over 536.1 IP at age 25 shows he still has some kinks to work out.

Speaking of Laffey, he seemed to be the favorite to replace Byrd in the rotation, but Laffey is still working through some minor mechanical problems he developed recently. The only reason Laffey was passed over this time is because the team wants him to get his delivery straightened out in a low-pressure environment; he’s definitely not being punished because of a few poor outings (8.53 ERA in his last five starts).

[EDIT: Since this was a quick post, I had completely forgotten about MLB service time being a deciding factor for Laffey here, even though that appears to be the primary reason Laffey is still in Buffalo. Oops. A hat tip to reader davemannddd for pointing this out with an explanation in the comments section. For a detailed and current explanation of managing the service time clock and how it relates to current Tribe players, check out this article by Jay at LGT.]

There’s a strong chance Laffey will finish the year in Buffalo since the team already knows what he’s capable of in the Majors. Guys like Reyes, Jackson, and other starters in AAA should receive the bulk of the innings at the back of the rotation as the team’s extended Spring Training continues.

Former Redbird Makes Cleveland Debut

Former Cardinal Anthony Reyes made his Cleveland debut on Friday and made a positive contribution to his new team right away. Reyes worked 6.1 innings against Toronto, scattering 7 hits, 1 BB, and an earned run. The 26 year old right-hander also struck out four on an efficient 88 pitches. Reyes looked very comfortable on the mound despite pitching in a foreign uniform against a different league. He attacked the strike zone in his first start and threw over 70% of his pitches for strikes.

I was impressed with the quick pace and calm demeanor that Reyes brought to the mound. I also liked the fact that he consistently pounded the strike zone and tended to stay ahead in the count despite not having any overpowering pitches. Reyes relies on changing speeds, horizontal movement, and precise location to get batters out.

This may not be a fair comparison, but the first pitcher that came to mind (at least in terms of style) while watching Reyes was Paul Byrd. Many of the pitches Reyes tossed up looked like they were going to get hammered, but Toronto never seemed to get a hold of anything on a regular basis. Byrd has a tendency to bob and weave his way through starts in a similar fashion, despite not having a blazing fastball or filthy changeup either (upon further investigation, Byrd uses a wider array of breaking pitches, covers a larger part of the plate, and has a lower overall velocity than Reyes). There may be more movement behind Reyes’ stuff than I can see that is causing players to hit foul or ground balls rather than hits. As tenuous as Reyes’ style may seem, it was very effective on Friday.

One possible issue I noticed is that Reyes pitched almost exclusively on the outer half of the plate (the one time I remember him going inside ended up as a hit; probably why I remember it). Instead, Reyes tends to alternate between his fastball and changeup from the middle of the plate to just outside the batters box in an attempt to bait the batter into swinging at his pitch.

Reyes’ changeup (and to a lesser degree, his heater) features a cutting motion that moves away from righties that helps him with this strategy. His curveball has the most extreme lateral movement, but I’m not sure he had the best control over his curve this time. Actually, I really wasn’t sure if he was throwing as many changeups as Gameday said he was (going just by Gameday, he threw a ton). His fastball may have been so slow much of the time that the pitch f/x sensors listed it as a changeup.

According to Fangraphs, Reyes tends to throw his fastball 66% of the time, followed by a changeup 16%, and a curve about 14.5%. The fastball has an average speed right around 90 MPH, while the change and curve tend to be similar in terms of speed at 76 MPH (basically what he threw Friday). The fact that his two secondary pitches are so similar in speed and have a nice 15 MPH difference from his fastball could make it difficult to pick up his pitches when he mixes them properly.

Another thing I was a little concerned about was that Reyes seemed to be hanging some of his pitches. Even after batters saw him a second or third time though, they didn’t seem to take advantage of what appeared to be hanging pitches, so I guess he was mixing his location and speed up enough to negate this.

Overall, I was very pleased with Reyes’ first outing and look forward to when he toes the rubber against Baltimore next week. What I’m still curious about is how a more patient and powerful offense responds to his pitching style (sorry Baltimore, not going to cut it there).

The biggest mark against Reyes that I’ve heard is that he had a falling out with the coaching staff in St. Louis. Apparently, pitching coach Dave Duncan insisted on changing Reyes’ pitching style into more of a groundball pitcher (maybe not a bad idea, but if a young, thus-far successful pitcher is truly against it, it’s probably not a good idea to force him). Fortunately, Carl Willis has a pretty good track record of helping pitchers get their confidence back through the proper adjustments, so I don’t see that being a problem in Cleveland.

Throw in Reyes' career 3.22 ERA, 1.09 WHIP, and 4.39 K/BB ratio in 422 minor league innings and you have a guy with a lot of potential, but not a lot of opportunity to show it lately. Then again, Cleveland already has a young pitching prospect who dominated the minors to the tune of a 2.25 ERA, 1.17 WHIP, and 3.10 K/BB ratio who has yet to find consistent success in the majors. Hopefully both of these guys find their footing again in Cleveland.

Is Betancourt Broken?

This is the first time I've used any Pitch f/x tools in depth, so this article is a bit of an experiment. If you happen to notice any flaws in my use of these stats or if something is not explained well enough, feel free to leave a comment. I'd like to use more of this type of analysis in the future, but for now there might be a few speed bumps.

Rafael Betancourt took the phrase “lights out” to a new level last season. The Tribe’s bullpen ace put together a career year setting up closer Joe Borowski through the regular season and into the playoffs. Cleveland rewarded Betancourt with a two year extension (plus a club option) worth $5.4 million guaranteed over the winter.

Betancourt has struggled for much of 2008 though, underperforming in almost every category compared to his career numbers. Betancourt may have greatly raised expectations for 2008 given his outstanding 2007 campaign, but to expect those types of numbers a second consecutive year is unrealistic. Betancourt’s 1.47 ERA, .76 WHIP, and ridiculous 8.89 K/BB ratio was the pitching equivalent of Hafner’s 179 OPS+ season and would be extremely difficult to match.

What Cleveland did expect from Betancourt was a productive, reliable reliever for the 8^th inning, but unfortunately Raffy has been unable to deliver. Betancourt has yet to throw at least nine innings in a month with an ERA under 5.00. He has yet to go on an extended scoreless streak and has followed a rough pattern of no more than three or four scoreless innings with a couple flawed outings for most of the season.

Despite a 6.00 ERA and 1.48 WHIP that has shown little sign of improving, Manager Eric Wedge has consistently gone with Betancourt in the late innings of the game. Betancourt has made the majority of his appearances in the 8^th and 9^th innings and in high leverage situations. Opponents have posted a 1.071, .922, and .716 OPS against Betancourt in the 7^th through 9^th innings, respectively.

Has Betancourt fallen so far that he can no longer make a positive contribution to the bullpen? There’s not much to counter Raffy’s inconsistency this season, but what has caused such a steep decline? To find out, I wanted to look at Betancourt’s previous performance, pitch selection, velocity, location, and delivery.

Stat Comparison

Below are Betancourt’s stats for the last three seasons:

Year	IP	ERA	WHIP	K/BB	K/9	BB/9	HR/9	LD%	LOB%
2006	56.2	3.81	1.11	4.36	7.62	1.75	1.11	25.1	71.4
2007	79.1	1.47	0.76	8.89	9.08	1.02	0.45	19.7	86.4
2008	42.0	6.00	1.48	3.00	9.00	3.00	1.71	20.8	65.0
Career	350.1	3.19	1.11	4.33	8.10	2.11	0.92	21.1	75.6

The first items that jump out to me are Betancourt’s BB/9 rate and his LOB%. These two items seem to be driving each other up, since the more batters he issues free passes to, the longer the inning and the more scoring opportunities the other team will get. Even in an average 2006 season, Betancourt stranded over 70% of all baserunners with that number spiking at 86.4% in 2007.

A lack of control seems to be driving up the walk rate, but Betancourt is still missing bats at the same rate as last season, which is kind of odd. I would have expected Betancourt to issue fewer strikeouts if his control was suffering. Betancourt’s combination of peripherals basically comes from a surplus of opportunities. An increased number of walks (3.00/9 IP) and hits (.288 AVG against compared to .188 last year) issued makes the average appearance longer, thus providing more opportunities to strike people out, albeit in a less efficient manner.

Betancourt’s strikeout rate is somewhat misleading, but the other peripherals are more accurate in terms of his actual performance.

Betancourt is also giving up about the same number of line drives (balls in play more likely to fall for a hit) as in 2007, but this could be deflated by a lack of opportunities, i.e. the batter is walked rather than hitting a ball into play. The balls that do get hit seem to be leaving the yard at a much higher rate than normal though (1.71 HR/9 compared to 0.92 career).

Pitch Selection and Velocity

Here is a table showing the percentage of time a pitch was used with the average velocity in parentheses. The pitch selection data was taken from Betancourt’s Fan Graphs page.

Year	Fastball	Slider	Change	Total Pitches
2006	85.9% (92.3)	4.0% (82.2)	4.4% (84.1)	903
2007	85.8% (91.4 mph)	10.1% (81.8)	4.1% (82.9)	1161
2008	76.1% (91.4)	13.1% (80.9)	10.8% (83.1)	747
Career	83.6% (91.8)	7.0% (81.6)	5.2% (83.4)	3845

I included data for the past three seasons, but Betancourt only used a curveball in 2006 5.7% of the time, so I excluded it from the table. The percentages will not add up to 100% because there was a small percentage from each year that could not be classified as any one pitch.

Betancourt’s average velocity has changed very little between 2007 and 2008. I was surprised to see no change in his fastball velocity, but he did lose about one MPH from his slider. Another surprise was the degree to which he lessened the use of his fastball. In terms of velocity, the fastball doesn’t seem to be any less effective, yet it has given way to a 6.7% increase in changeups thrown and a 3.0% increase in sliders.

According to a recent brief from Indians.com,

Betancourt has battled some back issues and tweaked his mechanical delivery a bit. The change in command has included Betancourt not relying completely on his fastball, which has historically been both his predominant and dominant pitch.

This is the first I’ve heard of Raffy’s back problems and mechanical changes, so I’m not sure if they occurred mid-season or in Spring Training. It seems that this reduction in the use of his fastball and reliance on secondary pitches were prompted by these injuries and on advice from the coaching staff.

One thing that I’m not sure of is how much last season’s work load is affecting Betancourt this season. Betancourt threw a career high 89.1 innings, including the playoffs, in 2007 and may be suffering from some wear and tear. This may be related to the back issues he has experienced, thus the need to alter his delivery.

Delivery and Location

I used a set of Pitch f/x data from 2007 and 2008 to try and identify any changes in Betancourt’s pitch location and delivery. All the Pitch f/x data and graphs below were compiled by Josh Kalk and can be found online at The Hardball Times and his blog.

Plot of Release Points for 2007

Plot of Release Points for 2008

The two release point tables basically show what their name implies; the point at which the ball leaves Betancourt’s hand during his delivery. This shows Betancourt’s arm slot, or the range in which his arm passes during a pitch, and any inconsistencies or trends that appear between the two seasons. Since the data shown is only a sample of Betancourt’s total pitches thrown it’s best to think of the data as an average representation.

Using the graphs, I made a rough measurement of Betancourt’s arm slot range and broke it down by pitch type (some pitchers vary their arm angle depending on the pitch). I focused on the difference in the arm slot between the two seasons to see how much Betancourt may have altered his mechanics. Note that the scale used is in feet, so even a small change could have a noticeable impact on how a pitch crosses the plate.

Arm Slot Ranges for 2007

Pitch	Avg. Horizontal Release Point Range	Horizontal Range Difference	Avg. Vertical Release Point Range	Vertical Range Difference
Fastball	-3 : -1.25 ft.	1.75 ft.	5.8 : 6.5 ft.	0.7 ft.
Slider	-2.75 : -1.5 ft.	1.25 ft.	5.8 : 6.6 ft.	0.8 ft.

Arm Slot Ranges for 2008

Pitch	Avg. Horizontal Release Point Range	Horizontal Range Difference	Avg. Vertical Release Point Range	Vertical Range Difference
Fastball	-2.7 : -1.5 ft.	1.2 ft.	5.8 : 6.8 ft.	1.0 ft.
Slider	-2.6 : -1.6 ft.	1.0 ft.	6.0 : 6.8 ft.	0.8 ft.
Changeup	-2.7 : -1.7 ft.	1.0 ft.	6.1 : 6.8 ft.	0.7 ft.

In 2007, the overall arm slot range for the horizontal axis was 1.75 ft (21 in) and a vertical axis of .7 ft (8.4 in) for his fastball. Similar numbers appear for the slider with a 1.25 ft (15 in) vertical axis and a 0.8 ft (9.6 in) horizontal axis. I keep referring back to 2007 because whatever Betancourt was doing back then was extremely effective.

In 2008, Betancourt is using a wider horizontal range to deliver his slider, but has not altered the vertical range. The biggest change is in his fastball delivery, showing a .55 ft (6.6 in) difference in the horizontal range and a .3 ft (3.6 in) difference in the vertical range between 2007 and 2008. This is actually a very small difference in deliver considering the precision of the data and the amount of times the pitcher has to repeat the motion.

Given how large Betancourt’s normal arm slot is (21 in by 8.4 in for the 2007 fastball), a small change like this may have pushed him just over the edge and affected his pitch location. This is just a theory though, since a difference of 6.6 in and 3.6 in just seems so small when compared to how big the overall range is. Another theory is that the small change in his release point is simply result of intentional mechanical changes and is not a detrimental effect from a tired arm or other ailment. As far as I can tell, it does not appear that Betancourt is suffering from any major inconsistencies due to a change in his release point.

Vertical versus Horizontal Pitch Movement for 2007

Vertical versus Horizontal Pitch Movement for 2008

The two graphs above show the final location of Betancourt’s pitches as they cross home plate. Home plate is represented by point zero on the horizontal axis. A pitch located on the negative horizontal axis would be inside to a right-handed batter and off the plate to a left-handed batter.

Difference in Average Movement for 2007

Pitch	Difference in Avg. Horizontal Movement	Difference in Avg. Vertical Movement
Fastball	10 in.	14.5 in.
Slider	12.5 in.	12.5 in.

Difference in Average Movement for 2008

Pitch	Difference in Avg. Horizontal Movement	Difference in Avg. Vertical Movement
Fastball	11 in.	10 in.
Slider	8.5 in.	8.8 in.

First, Betancourt’s fastball has lost a full 4.5 in of vertical movement between 2007 and 2008. Considering how small the difference between a homerun and a groundout can be for a batter, I think this is a significant factor. While the fastball still runs in to rightys, it tends to run flatter on the vertical axis than it used to. This lack of vertical movement could make it easier to make contact with the ball and send it farther.

Second, Betancourt’s slider has seen a drastic drop-off in overall movement. The slider has a difference of 4 in on the horizontal and 3.7 in on the vertical axes between 2007 and 2008.

Just looking at the graphs shows a lot less movement on the slider. This could result in more hanging sliders that don't drop off or sliders that are less effective in fooling the batter and setting up the fastball properly. Considering Betancourt has actually increased the use of his slider by 3% and reduced the use of his fastball by 9.7%, this seems like a really bad combination. Unfortunately, there isn’t a comparison for the changeup because it wasn’t recorded by Pitch f/x in 2007 for some reason.

I think Betancourt is struggling to integrate the new mechanics and secondary pitches into his routine. The significant reduction in using his fastball combined with a seemingly steep learning curve in mastering the slider appear to be the biggest culprits in Raffy’s poor season. There is a good chance that Betancourt will eventually become more comfortable with these changes and revert back to form in the near future.