Cleveland May Skip Weak Free Agent Market

With the annual GM Winter Meetings starting on Monday in Indianapolis, there will be a flurry of activity surrounding the free agent market. Obviously, the rebuilding Indians aren’t going to be spending much money on free agents this off-season, but that didn’t stop new manager Manny Acta from dropping a few hints about what he wants for Christmas.

According to an interview on Castrovince’s blog, Acta was open to the possibility of bringing in a veteran starting pitcher (because “you can never go into Spring Training short on pitching”), a right-handed utility infielder to cover first base (in case LaPorta is still ailing in April), and possibly a veteran starting catcher (in case the rookie backstops are overwhelmed in managing the pitching staff). I’m not sure I agree with Acta’s assessment, but to be fair this was meant as an “ideal” scenario as far as what holes he would fill to bolster his young team in the short-term.

Representing the front office’s point of view heading to Indy, Shapiro gave the impression that he won’t even be shopping for his usual bargain bin signings this year:

"We don't have a defined need. We want to get better and improve and offset the volatility that goes with young players, but we don't have the pressure of having to complete a trade or sign a free agent."

That “volatility” associated with the team’s young players is basically another way of saying “we’re not totally sold on these guys to carry the team next season.” The level of confidence the front office has in players like Andy Marte, Jordan Brown, and Carlos Carrasco will be a key point in dictating how aggressive Cleveland is on the free agent market (the pitching staff seems to be garnering the most buzz in this regard). Jake Westbrook’s performance with Ponce of the Puerto Rican winter league may also influence how inclined the team is to pursue a veteran starting pitcher to help stabilize a comparatively inexperienced rotation.

It may seem odd to hear Acta casually mention adding a veteran starter when the team already has a healthy Westbrook on track for Spring Training. I’m pretty confident that Cleveland will be shopping Westbrook this season though, which would leave a significant void in the rotation. Westbrook is owed $11 million in 2010, so there will probably be some pressure from ownership to move his contract. Right now, it’s a matter of timing.

Cleveland may know Westbrook is healthy, but it would be wise to showcase him against major league competition to further boost his trade value. Barring any setbacks, I’d place Westbrook’s return value maybe a notch or two above Pavano (which yielded pitcher Yohan Pino from the Twins). The fact that Pavano was due only about $1.5 million and Westbrook will be guaranteed significantly more than that could make him less appealing as a stop-gap acquisition for a contender. Then again, Westbrook is a better pitcher than Pavano to begin with and has been known to go on ridiculous hot streaks, so concerns over his price tag may be dampened heading into the mid-season trade deadline.

Either way, it’s doubtful Westbrook is moved this winter due to his recent health issues and lack of major league innings. Interest in Jake will probably start to gain steam as the season matures and contenders start to contemplate holes in their rotations.

Even if Cleveland decides to pursue a pitcher, are there even any veteran hurlers on the market worth signing? Guys like Jarrod Washburn, Rich Harden, Vicente Padilla, Justin Duchscherer, and Jon Garland are beyond the Tribe’s price range. John Smoltz and Pedro Martinez are interesting options, but it would be to their advantage to stay in the National League and their endurance makes them a poor fit for a team that would be looking for innings to lessen the workload of their developing arms. Plus, Pedro may command a decent raise with his performance in the playoffs for Philly last year.

As intriguing as it would be to have a veteran like Smoltz or Martinez mentoring the pitchers, isn’t that what the coaching staff is for? If they sign a free agent who is only available to pitch half the time (or less) because of durability issues, they’d essentially be paying $2-5 million for a part-time player and an extra coach. This doesn’t seem like an especially wise use of a roster spot or what limited funds are available to improve the team.

Granted, there is a different dynamic involved when comparing a player-coach and player-player relationship. There could certainly be some aspects to the latter teaching arrangement that I am undervaluing or are non-occurring between a player and a formal coach. Still, now doesn’t seem like an appropriate time to bring in that type of player given the team’s financial struggles and abundance of available arms.

Also, it’s not as if the rotation would consist of a bunch of fresh-faced rookies right out of the gate. Laffey (264.2 IP) and Masterson (217.2 IP) have been up long enough to understand the game and what’s expected of them at this level, even making an appearance in the postseason. Huff spent much of 2009 in Cleveland and appears to be ML ready. With 395 and 498 innings logged in the Majors over four seasons, Sowers and Carmona are well-seasoned, despite their individual struggles (I’m carrying over my prediction from last year: if Carmona doesn’t get it together the pitching staff is in big trouble regardless). Carlos Carrasco and Hector Rondon are another story, but again, their development track ultimately falls to the coaching staff.

The team will have some juggling to do in managing their starters. Carmona is a lock for the rotation, although Sowers’ role is less certain; both are out of minor league options. Masterson offers some flexibility in that he can move back to the bullpen, but I think the organization has a strong desire to test him as a starter for now. If that’s the case, Sowers may be used as a long-reliever. This could yield more work than you’d think, especially if Carmona or others have trouble going deep into games or the team wants to manage the workload of certain pitchers.

Carrasco will likely start the season in Columbus as an emergency starter or whenever Westbrook’s rotation spot opens up via trade. Due to a lack of experience in the upper minors and service time considerations, I’d be surprised if Rondon was called up before the second half of the season.

And in case you were wondering, Anthony Reyes will likely miss the entire 2010 season as he recovers from ulnar collateral ligament reconstruction surgery, so he’s a non-factor. Scott Lewis (remember him?) spent most of 2009 trying to get healthy in the minors, but could contribute at some point in 2010 (no idea when or in what capacity though).

Below is how I see the Indians’ rotation shaking out to start the season:

1.) Westbrook

2.) Carmona

3.) Laffey*

4.) Masterson

5.) Huff*

6.) Sowers* (bullpen/emergency starter)

7.) Carrasco (Triple-A)

* Left-hander

There are always a few surprises when it comes to distributing starts over a season, which means players in Columbus like Chuck Lofgren, Yohan Pino, or Zach Jackson could enter the fray at some point. For an example of this unpredictability, see Tomo Ohka’s six starts with the Tribe in 2009.

Returning to the question of a free agent signing, does Cleveland have enough starting pitching depth to make it through the season without over-exposing their prospects? This is literally the (multi) million dollar question for Cleveland. It’s not an easy question to answer, especially if you factor in the possible departure of Westbrook. On the one hand, there just aren’t many quality, affordable starters on the market. On the other, the team will only need that additional starter in the event of an unlikely string of injuries or a drastic failure in performance by multiple pitchers, paired with a trade that may or may not occur (plus there always seems to be a journeyman available on waivers to eat innings).

Assuming Cleveland has around $5 million to work with (based on what I’ve heard, this could be a generous guess), wants a veteran presence, and doesn’t want to commit to more than a one year deal, who’s available this off-season?

Bartolo Colon

Colon fell off the radar following his 2005 CY-winning season with Anaheim. He suffered a torn rotator cuff in the 2005 postseason and was limited by shoulder soreness and trips to the DL for much of the ’06 and ’07 seasons. Colon found some success in 2008 on a minor league deal with Boston, averaging 5.57 innings over 7 starts with a 118 ERA+, 1.38 WHIP, and 2.70 K/BB ratio. He signed a $1 million contract with the White Sox in 2009, making 12 starts over 62.1 IP (5.17 IP/GS) with a 111 ERA+, 1.44 WHIP, and 1.81 K/BB. It’s unclear how much injury hindered his 2009 season, but Colon’s decision to withhold an inflamed elbow from the team contributed to his release in September.

Assuming he hasn’t held a grudge about being traded to Montreal and still has a strong desire to pitch, a return to Cleveland could do wonders for his focus. Cleveland’s training staff is also among the best in the league and may keep him healthier than he’s been in the past. His endurance is questionable, but when healthy the 36-year-old has been able to provide quality innings and appears to have enough left in the tank to be a serviceable fifth starter. Colon could be worth taking a flyer on as there would be minimal risk involved in a minor league deal. I’d consider him more of a depth signing than a true starter though.

Livan Hernandez

You want an innings eater, this is the guy (just don’t expect anything special). Livan Hernandez has been adding to his journeyman status the last four seasons, bouncing between Washington, Arizona, Minnesota, Colorado, the Mets, and back to Washington. During that time, the 34-year-old righty has averaged nearly 200 innings per season, which is sort of remarkable considering what he’s tossing out there on a given night.

Considering the Mets and Nationals ranked near the bottom of the league on defense last year, Hernandez really wasn’t that bad. Over 31 starts he posted a 4.44 FIP, 1.56 WHIP, 1.52 K/BB, and 1.10 GB/FB over 183.2 IP. Ok, so he does allow a ton of baserunners and the 22.3% line drive rate is a bit steep, but hey: that’s 180 fewer innings you don’t have to worry about distributing amongst the youthful rotation or an assuredly busy bullpen (quantity over quality in this case).

Unless the Indians can come away with some sort of coup elsewhere, Hernandez is probably my favorite candidate to play the role of veteran starter/innings eater/insurance policy for the rotation. The Mets picked him up on a minor league deal last February with a base salary of $1 million, plus some modest performance incentives. It seems reasonable for Hernandez to look for a similar deal this year, although he may not be thrilled at the prospect of another minor league stint.

I think Cleveland holds an advantage over most teams in this case, since they could essentially guarantee Hernandez the type of playing time others can’t (although other non-contenders could also provide ample innings, so this may not be that strong of a bargaining chip). If the organization feels this is the best safety net for the rotation in 2010, it would be realistic for them to flip Westbrook’s salary at some point while bringing in Hernandez on a one-year, $1-2.5 million deal.

Kelvim Escobar

Escobar had to have his right shoulder surgically repaired prior to the 2008 season and he’s been trying to get healthy ever since. Escobar’s comeback trail has been littered with various aches and pains, forcing him into a prolonged rehab period that stretched into the entire 2009 season. After sitting out all of 2008, he made his only major league appearance of 2009 in a June 6^th start, but simply didn’t have enough strength in his shoulder to continue pitching. As he approaches the two year mark since his surgery, Escobar plans on showcasing his arm in the Venezuelan Winter League this winter and may work out for individual teams in January (according to Jerry Crasnick at ESPN).

The fact that Escobar is advertising his participation in winter ball indicates that he is fairly confident in his health this time around. However, it is unclear if he can still be an effective starting pitcher, as his velocity and endurance have likely taken a significant hit due to the severity of his injury. It may also take time for him to re-adjust to pitching in the majors and become comfortable working in the strike zone again. This re-adjustment could be difficult if he suddenly finds himself without his 94 mph fastball (I’m not sure if he’s been able to further integrate and improve his off-speed pitches in the meantime).

Escobar may ultimately end up as a reliever to help preserve his fragile shoulder. Angels manager Mike Scioscia entertained the idea of shifting Escobar to the pen before having to shut him down completely in 2009. It would make sense for both parties to have Escobar spend a large portion of 2010 as a reliever. This would reduce the risk involved for whoever signs him, since he would be cheaper and easier to replace if he were to land on the DL. It would also benefit Escobar, since a back-end bullpen gig would provide a low-pressure environment against major league competition in which to test his shoulder and get acclimated.

The Red Sox, Rays, Orioles, Yankees, Mets, Mariners, and Brewers have all been connected to Escobar through the rumor mill, so there would be plenty of competition for his services if Cleveland decided to enter the mix. All of those teams, minus the Rays, could probably offer a more lucrative contract than Cleveland, not to mention a chance to play for a contender (Orioles excluded).

Cleveland could certainly offer an incentivized minor league deal, but the salary ceiling for those incentives would fall short of the field. The Tribe’s lack of disposable funds should keep them on the sidelines, but Escobar isn’t exactly worth pursuing anyway as he does not meet the team’s needs at this stage of his career.

Ben Sheets

I had been casually mulling the idea of Cleveland bringing in Ben Sheets on a Pavano-Plus type of contract: a low base salary of $1.5-3 million, but with a higher salary ceiling and better incentives contingent on innings pitched and time spent on the DL. Even if the only way Sheets would sign is if he had the chance to make $6-8 million after incentives, Cleveland could still ship him to a contender for a prospect or cash at the trade deadline if he stays healthy and pitches like the Ben Sheets of old. It sounded like a good idea, until I heard how much Sheets is looking for in his next contract.

$12 million guaranteed, if the report is to be believed. I understand his agent is trying to get a good deal for his client, but considering Sheets had surgery on a torn flexor tendon in his right elbow last February it’s sort of amusing to see that kind of figure suggested. The only way Sheets is going to come close to that amount is if he signs a heavily incentivized contract and stays healthy enough to meet all his performance goals. No team is going to give him $12 million up front; something had to have gotten lost in translation here.

At any rate, the 31-year-old Louisiana native has not made a major league start since September of 2008 before the elbow injury cost him a chance to make his first career post-season start. Sheets was fairly impressive en route to a 3.38 FIP, 1.15 WHIP, and 3.36 K/BB over 198.1 IP (31 GS). If he can replicate those numbers, he’d certainly be worth $12 million on the market, but given his injury history (past and present) that’s a big “if.” Word on the street is that several teams are interested in his services, with the Rangers appearing to be the front runners (they made an attempt to sign him in 2008 before the seriousness of his injury came out). The Yankees, Mets, and Orioles have also been connected to the right-hander.

Obviously, the anticipated price tag alone (incentives or not) will discourage Cleveland from getting too involved with Sheets, but he presents an intriguing risk/reward value for teams better equipped to absorb the salary hit if he ends up collecting a large chunk of his contract before succumbing to injury and becoming untradeable (assuming he makes it out of the starting gate). If Cleveland had a legitimate chance to contend, I’d advocate pursuing Sheets on a team-friendly contract given his potential upside when healthy. Heck, even if they weren’t going to contend, but still had the cash, I wouldn’t mind seeing them take a chance on turning Sheets into a prime trade chip.

A weak free agent class and Cleveland’s lack of financial muscle makes it seem unlikely that they will be signing any free agents to major league contracts this winter. Fortunately, the organization’s revamped farm system contains enough depth to make free agents a luxury, as they arguably have enough pieces on their current roster to field a decent team in 2010 while they further develop their key prospects. While it is unusual for a team to completely forego the free agent market, the money saved on a weak talent pool could yield a better value in the future.

Francisco vs. Dunn

It's no secret that the free agent market has been down this off-season, leaving many All-Star caliber players unemployed in the first week of February. Teams have been more cautious about adding to their payrolls and handing out long-term contracts than in the past due to the uncertainty brought on by the economy. Without a reliable revenue stream from the fans, merchandising, and corporate sponsors, most teams have limited their free agent acquisitions to one or two year deals at bargain prices. While the Yankees have proven themselves recession-proof, small and mid-market teams are feeling the crunch.

Jason Giambi's one year, $5.25 million deal with Oakland and Pat Burrell's two year, $16 million deal with Tampa Bay should turn out to be excellent bargains in terms of offensive value for the money spent. Two productive sluggers like Giambi and Burrell wouldn't normally take significant pay cuts in free agency, but they were wise to recognize the tough situation most teams are in and chose to take a short-term, guaranteed paycheck instead of looking for a big contract that just wasn't there. These two contracts may have set the market for players like Bobby Abreu and Adam Dunn, neither of whom has found any offers to their liking. Dunn is rumored to be seeking a four year deal in the $50+ million range, but with Spring Training quickly approaching, a renewed awareness of defensive value around the league, and an apparent lack of serious suitors it seems doubtful that Dunn will get more than a fraction of that.

What does this mean for the Tribe in 2009? Not much. The team added nearly $19 million to their existing payroll and have already exceeded their planned budget for this season. Cleveland will not be making any more additions to the payroll unless a significant contract is moved first (which won't happen either). So even though there are several quality free agents available at steeply reduced prices, Cleveland will not be signing any of them. The question I'd like to answer is whether or not Cleveland should add one of these players. Would Adam Dunn be enough of an upgrade over Ben Francisco in left field to justify the additional money spent? First I'd like to look at what each player has to offer before moving on to a direct comparison.

Francisco on Offense

Year	PA	EqA	2B	HR	BB/K	OBP	SLG	wRAA
2007	66	.261	5	3	0.16	.303	.500	-.04
2008	447	.270	32	15	0.47	.332	.438	3.2

Ben Francisco had a solid overall season in 2008, slugging 32 doubles and 15 homers behind a .266 / .332 / .438 line. Unfortunately, a strong start was overshadowed by a miserable September where Francisco hit .188 with a season low .619 OPS in 81 PA. Francisco may have posted an .832 OPS before the All Star break, but that final month really drained the life out of what had been a strong rookie season. The late season slump also shook the club's confidence in Francisco, leaving him with something to prove heading into his second Major League season.

While the numbers suggest an average offensive performance in 2008 (OPS+ 100), Francisco was able to build upon the 66 PA he compiled in 2007. The last time Francisco faced ML pitching, he had only a 0.16 BB/K ratio and .303 OBP on a shaky .350 BABIP in 66 PA. Last season, Francisco elevated his BB/K ratio to 0.47 (his career BB/K in the minors is 0.56), had a .332 OBP, and saw his BABIP move to a more reliable .301. Ben also featured an improved plate discipline, becoming more selective in the types of pitches to attack. He swung at pitches outside the strike zone 8.4% less often and made contact with the ball in 81% of his at-bats. These are two excellent areas to see improvement for a developing hitter. Francisco had a better time recognizing which pitches to lay-off and was able to square up more often on hittable pitches.

Unlike David Dellucci, the team can pencil in the right-handed Francisco regardless of the opposing pitcher. Francisco had a .794 OPS against lefties and a .762 OPS against righties in 2008. Away from the Jake was a different story though, as Ben had a 109 point difference in his home and road OPS'. This is one aspect of Ben's game that will have to dramatically improve if he hopes to keep pace ahead of the prospects in Buffalo. Matt LaPorta and Michael Brantley will be challenging for Francisco's job from the start, so he really can't afford to go through a month-long slump like he has in the past. The good news, at least for Francisco, is that with Dellucci confined to the bench (or the waiver wire, mercifully) and the Tribe's Dynamic Duo still toiling in AAA he should have plenty of room to breathe at the start of the season. The bad news for Francisco is that Mark DeRosa is a more than adequate outfielder and may be asked to step in if Francisco struggles.

Regardless of whether benching Francisco for Jamey Carroll (who would take over at third with DeRosa in left) is the best move, it is definitely a move Wedge has been inclined to make in the past. Francisco will have some slack to work with, but the team does have other options if he stumbles at the plate. Given the sense of urgency displayed by Cleveland in retooling for 2008, it's clear the team knows how much is riding on this season. It's not like Cleveland has been exuding confidence in their outfield situation with the likes of Garko and Barfield under consideration for Spring Training reps beyond the diamond. An early summer call-up for one of their stud outfield prospects is not out of the question, even if it defers from the normal timetable given to such prospects.

I understand the argument against Francisco seeing any notable growth as a player because of his age; perfectly sound reasoning. At 26, he's not your typical sophomore and is probably near his ceiling as a player, if he isn't already there. I'm not expecting any major leaps in his game, but it's not unheard of for players with the right tools to break through at an advanced age if given the opportunity. Look at Casey Blake's career, he didn't even become a ML starter until age 29 and went on to post several solid seasons for the Tribe. Starting third baseman Mark DeRosa is another example of a player posting the best numbers of their career at a later age. We're not talking about a contract extension, just whether or not Ben's capable of holding down the fort until LaPorta and company arrive in 2009.

Ben did not put up any big numbers in his rookie season, but he was never expected to be a major offensive threat. Instead, he showed he still has the tools to succeed as a hitter in the Majors. Now that he has a full year of experience to go with a refined plate approach, Francisco may be poised for an even better campaign with the Tribe. If he can avoid the second-half slump he suffered in 2008, I think there is a strong chance Francisco will see at least modest gains at the plate.

Francisco on Defense

Year	Pos	Inn	PO	BIZ	Plays	RZR	OOZ (%PO)	UZR/150
2007	LF	102	26	21	17	.810	9 (34.6)	29.0
2008	LF	643	150	136	122	.897	28 (18.6)	-0.3

PO = putouts; BIZ = balls in zone; RZR = revised zone rating; OOZ = outside of zone; UZR/150 = ultimate zone rating adjusted for 150 games

Francisco more than pulled his weight in the outfield, displaying good range and a strong arm on defense. In terms of UZR/150 (that's ultimate zone rating adjusted for 150 games), Francisco was above average compared to most ML left fielders with at least 500 innings. His -0.3 mark (he basically broke even in terms of runs his defense cost the team) is significantly better than the next lowest player in Carlos Lee (-2.0), while most of the players with positive UZRs possess exceptional range (Francisco wouldn't be as far from the top if it weren't for transplants like Carl Crawford setting up shop in left). Somewhere well above Lee and on the periphery of the speedy outfielders sounds like a fair estimate of Francisco's range in left.

While he doesn't cover as much ground as some, Francisco does cast a fairly wide net in the field. Francisco's OOZ (out of zone, or the number of outs made by a fielder outside his normal defensive zone) shows that 18.6% of his total putouts were made beyond the expected defensive zone for a left fielder. This is a very respectable range, even though left field is a less demanding position than say, center field. Also, according to THT's Outfield Arms metric Francisco would have saved 3.1 runs over 200 opportunities through kills (throwing a runner out) and holds (preventing an eligible runner from advancing further). For comparison, I a rating around 1.0 run saved is par for the course, making Francisco above average in both range and arm strength.

Overall, Francisco is an asset on defense and has had no trouble holding down his position.

Dunn on Defense

Adam Dunn was one of the last free agents I would have expected to be available in February, yet there he is, unsigned. Now that General Managers are placing a higher premium on defense, statues like Dunn have seen their overall market value plummet. Why some team hasn't dropped a bag of cash in Dunn's lap to be their DH is beyond me though. I had read a while back that Dunn was insistent on continuing to play in the outfield (probably not a smart negotiating move), though he may have dropped this request since then. Plus, I fail to see how Dunn could turn down a multi-million dollar contract at this point just so he can continue to exercise his worst attribute as a ballplayer (props to Dunn for having the right attitude and not wanting to quit on defense, but it isn't terribly practical in this case). So even though moving to first base is a possibility (he has 97 career starts there) and would take some of the pressure off Dunn's lack of mobility, he wants no part of the infield on a full-time basis.

Did Dunn really do more harm than good by making all those starts in left field? Below are Dunn's defensive stats from the last three seasons:

Year	Pos	Inn	PO	BIZ	Plays	RZR	OOZ (%PO)	UZR/150
2006	LF	1321	279	270	237	.878	42 (15.0)	-11.0
2007	LF	1189	244	259	214	.826	31 (12.7)	-16.3
2008*	LF	915	191	179	161	.899	30 (15.7)	-13.5

*I only included Dunn's innings with Cincy in 2008 because it would have been tricky to calculate a combined value with Cincy and Arizona for each stat. The sample size for Arizona was small enough to not worry about anyway.

According to his UZR/150, Dunn cost his team 13.5 runs over 915 innings playing in left field. To give those -13.5 runs some perspective, among ML left fielders with at least 500 innings logged, only Chase Headley (that's a lot of ground to cover in Petco), Pat Burrell (now a DH), Jack Cust (kinda is a DH), Jason Bay (wasn't expecting him to be here), Delmon Young (first year in the Metrodome, should bounce back), and Luis Gonzalez (at 42 years old, I'll cut him some slack) were worse. There's no disputing that Dunn had a pretty rough time fielding his position in 2008. The same trend pops up in previous seasons as well (the annual variation shown is normal for defensive stats, he still hits double digits each year though). Also, who would have thought a guy as strong as Dunn would have a noodle-arm? Ok, that may not be a fair description, but he does struggle to keep runners in check. During his time in left field in 2008, Dunn's throwing actually cost his team 6.0 runs by itself.

Interestingly enough, Dunn's RZR (revised zone rating, or the proportion of balls hit into a fielder's zone that he successfully converts into an out) and OOZ are comparable to Francisco's. Francisco made a larger percentage of plays outside his defensive zone (18.6% to Dunn's 15.7%) but performed about the same as Dunn when fielding balls hit within the left field zone. This doesn't seem right at all. In fact, I can guarantee that in a fan poll, Francisco would display a better defensive reputation than Dunn.

Based purely on what I saw from Francisco last season, he's at the very least an average defender, while the stats cited earlier suggest he's above average in terms of runs saved. Meanwhile, Dunn's reputation certainly precedes him in terms of defensive deficiency. This is a good example of why empirical evidence is still way ahead of any current defensive metrics. It's cool to be able to quantify a player's range in terms of runs, but it's still a good idea to take those numbers with a grain of salt. Defensive stats are still being tweaked and refined by people much smarter than I.

Considering how many intricate variables go into the UZR formula (how hard a ball is hit, where it's hit, park factors, and the type of pitcher on the mound to name a few), it's not too surprising to see it produce a drastically different assessment compared to the revised zone ratings. Factor in a more reliable reputation for UZR and I think I'll stick with that in terms of quantifying each player's defensive value. Based on empirical evidence and the best available defensive stats, Ben Francisco is obviously a far superior defender to Adam Dunn.

Dunn on Offense

Year	PA	EqA	2B	HR	BB/K	OBP	SLG	wRAA
2006	683	.304	24	40	0.58	.365	.490	19.8
2007	632	.300	27	40	0.61	.386	.554	36.2
2008	651	.299	23	40	0.74	.386	.513	29.7

The consistency with which Dunn produces the same offensive numbers each year is almost comical. Seriously, who hits exactly 40 home runs for four straight seasons? Dunn specializes in hitting for power, drawing walks, and...that's basically it. The left-handed slugger has posted top five ML totals in both HR and BB in four of the past five seasons. Over eight Major League seasons, his career OBP is an outstanding .381 (sonnets have been written in tribute to Dunn's OBP). There's really not much to say about Dunn's bat that hasn't already been said. As far as launching taters and drawing walks, Dunn has been one of the best in baseball for several years running.

It may be foolish to wonder what the consequences of a Dunn power-outage would be since we're only discussing the short term. However, I'm curious just how big a factor the long ball is compared to all those walks in the context of Dunn's overall offense. If for some reason (a new ballpark, adjusting to a new league, or plain bad luck for example) Dunn sees a decline in his home run ability, how much of his value would he retain? Dunn does not possess much speed and has never been much of a doubles hitter, despite a consistently strong slugging percentage (obviously his SLG is supported mostly by homers). In 2008, his 23 doubles did not even crack the top 150 among all ML players. Excluding home runs, Dunn has never collected many extra base hits and has only two seasons (2004, 2005) with more than 30 doubles and at least 500 at-bats.

One way to determine how heavy Dunn's homers are within his overall offensive value is to consider equivalent average (EqA). EqA (set to the same scale as batting average, where .260 is the league average) is a good bet for evaluating pure offensive production in this case since it does not give homers a weighted advantage like OPS and its refined cousin, wOBA. Looking at the formula for raw EqA, (H + TB + 1.5*(BB + HBP + SB) + SH + SF) divided by (AB + BB + HBP + SH + SF + CS + SB) you can see that hits, total bases, walks, and stolen bases are among the most significant variables.

The fact that Dunn lacks much speed on the bases, plays in a hitter-friendly ballpark, and has a dearth of hits would have seriously dragged on Dunn's offensive numbers if it weren't for his ability to advance via base on balls. Dunn had about a .300 EqA the past two seasons, meaning he was a very valuable hitter despite the several factors working against him. As it turns out, all those walks would still carry the day in the event Dunn falls short of his annual 40 homer mark. Even though he's had a top five strikeout total every season of his career, Dunn still possesses the plate discipline to lay off pitches outside the zone and work the count. Dunn can get away with batting .236 since he reaches base nearly 40% of the time, regardless (you can criticize a player like Dunn all you want, just please don't base your argument on batting average).

Amazingly, Dunn only swung at pitches outside the zone 17.2% of the time in 2008 (this is quite good). On the other hand, he made contact with just 71.8% of the pitches he offered at last season. This is a pretty poor contact rate although it is in line with other sluggers like Thome and Howard who have a tendency to swing for the fences (unlike Dunn, they swing at balls outside the zone a lot more). Finally, pitchers showed a healthy respect for Dunn's power by throwing him a strike just 45.5% of the time. Dunn is in good company as far as striking fear in the hearts of scrub pitchers; only Josh Hamilton, Prince Fielder, and Vlad Guerrero (a notorious free-swinger) saw fewer pitches in the strike zone in 2008.

These trends highlight Dunn's all-or-nothing approach at the plate. While he is very good at identifying pitches not to hit (those outside the strike zone), his swing appears to have some major holes in it. Like the aforementioned Thome and Howard, Dunn usually attacks with a big power stroke to drive the ball as far as possible. This type of long, loaded swing will produce a lot of hard fly balls, but it also leaves the hitter vulnerable and unable to protect the plate as well as hitters with more compact swings who tend to focus on just making solid contact most of the time (singles and doubles). Dunn's approach is on the extreme end for power hitters, resulting in maximum power and minimal precision.

While some may argue otherwise, I don't see Dunn's approach as an issue. The majority of hitters are forced to make the tradeoff between crushing the ball or slapping a single when they come up to the plate anyway. Only a few elite players can consistently produce a true balance in their offensive attack (like Manny and Pujols). In other words, don't expect a guy who hits 40 homers to bat .300 in the same season. Both are valuable in their own way, but you can't expect to have the best of both worlds.

One could argue that Dunn needs the intimidation factor associated with those punishing home runs to maintain his high walk rate. Pitchers are obviously reluctant to throw strikes out of fear he will launch one into the bleachers. This theory is more relevant to a long term projection though, since the the 28-year old Dunn won't be experiencing a physical decline in power anytime soon. It would take a serious drop in power potential before pitchers decided to regularly challenge Dunn within the strike zone. Therefore, Dunn's walk rate won't be going away anytime soon. If he were to experience a decline in homers, this would still impact the bottom line for the team that signs him, bringing us back to the earlier question (sorry, I got a little off track).

What would happen once Dunn moved out of Cincinnati's home ballpark for the first time in his career? Dunn's numbers had to have benefited from all those seasons playing in a hitter friendly ballpark. According to ESPN, Great American Ballpark in Cincinnati had a 1.069 park factor in 2008, making it the seventh most hitter-friendly park in the Majors. Chase Field in Arizona, Dunn's post-trade home park, had the second highest factor at 1.135, possibly explaining why his performance did not suffer from the change in venue last season.

If Dunn were to spend half of his at-bats in Cleveland, there is a strong possibility he would experience some adverse effects. Progressive Field had a .995 overall park factor, but really suppressed home runs. Out of 30 ballparks, Cleveland had a HR park factor of .824; third lowest in the Majors (only Kaufmann Stadium and Petco Park saw fewer taters, in addition to having lower overall park factors than Progressive Field). Even if it's only a minor consideration, Dunn's performance will likely reflect his new home to some degree.

Wins and Salary

For me, the choice between Francisco and Dunn is contingent on the gap between Francisco's defensive value and Dunn's offensive value. As an above-average defender boasting at least an average bat, I expected Francisco to match up favorably to Dunn, whose atrocious defense cancels out quite a bit of his advantage on offense. To quantify these two factors I used FanGraphs' spiffy value wins table, replicated below.

Francisco FanGraphs Value Wins Table

Year	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Value Runs	Value Wins	Dollars
2007	-0.3	2.4	2.2	-1.3	3.0	0.3	$1.2
2008	3.7	-4.3	16.6	-6.3	9.7	1.0	$4.3

Dunn FanGraphs Value Wins Table

Year	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Value Runs	Value Wins	Dollars
2006	17.9	-12.4	22.8	-7.5	20.7	2.0	$7.4
2007	34.5	-14.9	21.1	-7.2	33.4	3.3	$13.3
2008	27.4	-22.8	21.7	-8.0	18.3	1.8	$8.2

For a detailed overview of how these numbers were calculated, click here and scroll down. The values most relevant to this analysis are Batting, Fielding, and Value Wins. Batting depicts the player's wRAA (offensive runs above average, this time adjusted for the home ballpark and league) while fielding is total UZR (both values were included in the player tables earlier). The Position adjustment accounts for the degree of difficulty for a player's defensive position. For example, left field is a much less demanding position to field than shortstop, so left fielders have a -7.5 run penalty compared to the +7.5 run bonus a shortstop receives (this stems from the idea that a player who can hit at a high level and field an elite defensive position is that much more valuable). The Replacement value addresses the monetary value of wins and a player's time on the field, as opposed to a lesser bench player (the concept of replacement level and calculating salaries can get complicated quick, so I'll let FanGraphs do the talking if you're so inclined).

Assuming positive values are good and negative values are bad for a player's value, the final formula plays out as basic math: wRAA + UZR + Position + Replacement = Value Runs.

As expected, Dunn's superior batting value is largely canceled out by his negative fielding value, producing 18.3 runs above replacement for the 2008 season. FanGraphs makes the run total easier to interpret by converting it into wins using a team's Pythagorean value (calculates a team's expected win-loss record based on its runs scored/against rate). Assuming roughly 10 runs equals 1 win, Dunn was responsible for 1.8 wins during his time with Cincinnati and Arizona.

For Francisco, his batting and fielding values are nearly a wash. I only cited Francisco's innings in LF earlier, while the UZR value shown here depicts his time at every position. Since Francisco was not as strong defensively at the other outfield positions, his fielding value takes a hit (this also results in a lower positional penalty than an exclusive left fielder). Francisco produced 9.7 runs above replacement overall, which translated into 1.0 win for the Tribe in 2008.

Note the difference in innings (288) and plate appearances (152) between Francisco and Dunn. This gives Dunn an advantage in terms of total wins (more chances to contribute results in more partial wins credited). As it stands, Francisco has about a 25% deficit to Dunn in total chances (innings + PA) which roughly equals .25 wins that Francisco never had the opportunity to earn. According to the numbers, Dunn was worth just half a win more (.55) than Francisco in 2008. That's a surprisingly slim difference considering the gap in experience and salary between the two outfielders. To be fair, Dunn did produce 3.3 wins in 2007 and saw his 2008 fielding runs suffer slightly from 128 innings at first base (-12.5 positional penalty), so unless Francisco takes a step forward offensively (or Dunn loses a step defensively) that .55 win difference has plenty of potential to grow.

Finally, assuming each win cost a team about $4.5 million in 2008, Dunn's calculated monetary value was $8.2 million while his actual salary was $13 million. Francisco holds a major advantage in this department and posted a sizable surplus in terms of his calculated value of $4.3 million and actual salary (close to the league minimum of $390,000 due to his brief service time).

I don't view Adam Dunn as enough of an upgrade to justify the money he's demanding (whether or not he gets anything resembling $12.5 million a year is another story). Whoever signs him is probably going to end up losing a few million dollars in undelivered value, although that team will hopefully be filling a dire need. Cleveland, on the other hand, does not have a legitimate need in left field due to their envious outfield depth in the high minors and flexibility within the Major League club. If Cleveland were to sign Dunn, they'd be paying a premium for an extra win, maybe two, in the form of a crowded roster, a downgraded defense, and even less financial flexibility than they had before (namely, none).

The fine line between Francisco and Dunn's overall value for 2008 showed that Cleveland would only be making an incremental upgrade for what amounts to a luxury. Dunn would have to go absolutely nuts at the plate to even begin to justify his atrocious defense and expected salary. Since there's no way Dunn is going to match his career year from 2004, his true offensive value will continue to be negated to the point of being a waste. So much of his overall value dies on the field it's like watching money get flushed down a toilet. I don't want to diminish Dunn's offensive prowess, but he really is costing himself potential salary by refusing to become a DH. At this point the market seems to have cooled so much I don't think even a concession to DH full time could salvage this winter for Dunn and his agent.

Which brings us to yet another issue with Dunn. Without a DH vacancy, there is no way for Cleveland to capitalize on Dunn's greatest asset, not to mention how idiotic it would be to have $24 million wrapped up in dual designated hitters. They were far better off spending that extra $12 million on filling holes at closer and third base (big difference between filling an actual hole and merely upgrading a position; we didn't have a real closer or third baseman until recently) rather than giving it to a free agent outfielder. Dunn is a few tools short of the full set and should not be grouped with or paid like the games truly elite players.

Cleveland absolutely made the right move in going with an inexpensive, low risk, high reward youth movement in left and watching their wisely spent funds (a.k.a. Wood and DeRosa) produce dividends elsewhere on the roster.

UZR, Value Wins formula, and associated stats taken from FanGraphs.

Outfield Arm ratings, RZR, and OOZ taken from The Hardball Times.

EqA taken from Baseball Prospectus.

Pavano Adds Cheap Depth to Tribe Rotation

I had a hunch Cleveland was going to make at least one more signing with whatever meager funds the front office could scrape together. Fortunately, the final signing was prefaced by the general manager stating “the lion's share of our resources have been committed,” so I knew not to get my hopes up. Still, Shapiro is one of the best around at identifying low risk, high reward players, stretching every available dollar, so something had to be up. Who will Shap’s rehab project be in 2009?

Cleveland fans, meet your new left fielder…..Sammy Sosa!

No, just kidding (sorry to anyone who just did a spit-take onto their monitor). Seriously though, Carl Pavano? I know the front office is basically broke at this point, but if we had a significant hole to fill couldn’t we have traded for someone? Please? Oh well, I guess Scott Boras doesn’t accept coupons.

Obviously, I’m not thrilled with this signing, partly because it’s such a crap shoot as to whether Pavano will be effective enough to justify even using him in the rotation. The last time King Carl (apparently this is the moniker Yankee fans bestowed upon him, very distinguished) made at least ten starts in the Major Leagues was when he managed to toss 100 innings over 17 starts with a 4.77 ERA and 1.47 WHIP in 2005. That was by far the most productive season New York wrung out of Pavano during his four year, $38 million contract (your turn, Burnett). Here is Pavano’s body of work over four seasons with New York, not including his minor league rehab starts:

Year	GS	IP	ERA	WHIP	K/BB	HR/9	GB/FB
2005	17	100.0	4.77	1.47	3.11	1.53	1.59
2006	DID NOT PITCH
2007	2	11.1	4.76	1.24	2.00	0.79	1.29
2008	7	34.1	5.77	1.49	1.50	1.31	0.96

I’m not sure why I bothered to add any extra peripherals to the table, since the sample size is either too small or nonexistent for the past three seasons. I’d say the lack of substantial innings from 2006 to 2008 sums up Pavano’s performance as well as anything. Despite enduring a stretch that would have ended the career of most pitchers, Pavano managed to get healthy enough to net a new contract. It seems like Pavano’s mini-comeback over seven starts from August 23 to September 25 played heavily into Shapiro’s decision to choose him over the likes of Mark Mulder, Bartolo Colon, and Freddy Garcia.

Mulder is still trying to get healthy (1.7 IP in 2008) and has struggled with his health just as much as Pavano lately. Colon gave Boston some solid emergency starts, but was back in the minors rehabbing by mid-June. I watched Garcia’s September start against Chicago and his pitches did not look Major League ready, even after rehab. In terms of cheap starting pitchers returning from injuries, Pavano really was the best bet.

Shapiro provided his take on Pavano’s recent activity in an interview on the team’s website:

"This is not a guy you're guessing is going to come back. He made seven starts [in August and September] last year, with no problems. He's in great shape right now. He's strong, fit and highly motivated."

I can understand the potential Shapiro saw based on those seven starts. Again, small sample size, but let’s take a closer look at those starts for lack of better information:

Team	IP	ER	H	BB	HR	K	Strike %	GB/FB
at BAL	5.0	3	7	1	0	5	59.3	2.25
TOR	6.0	1	3	1	0	1	58.3	0.3
at TBR	4.0	3	1	2	1	1	59.4	0.62
at LAA	5.1	5	6	1	2	2	62.1	0.87
TBR	5.1	3	5	2	1	3	61.0	1.42
BAL	5.0	2	6	1	0	2	64.3	1.28
at TOR	3.2	5	8	2	1	1	59.4	1.66

Pavano’s best and only quality start came against Toronto when he posted 1 ER, 3 H, 1 BB, and 1 K over 6 innings. He did manage to provide at least five innings of work in five of the seven starts, but with mixed results. Pavano’s numbers indicate a pretty bland performance, averaging 10.7 hits and 2.6 walks per nine innings with an ERA of 5.77. His other peripherals are much more interesting though.

Even though he averaged over a hit per inning, Pavano improved the percent of pitches he threw for strikes over his first six starts (59.3% to 64.3%). The fact that Pavano was not afraid to attack the zone and stuck to his game plan suggests he at least has some confidence back. Second, according to FanGraphs, Pavano’s O-Swing % of 27.0% (percent of pitches a batter swings at outside the strike zone) and F-Strike % of 55.8% (percent of first pitches thrown for a strike) are stronger than they were in his 2005 season with New York.

Again, the F-Strike % suggests Pavano is willing to be aggressive and attack hitters; good news for a pitcher who tends to rely on location and control to get outs. Unfortunately there isn’t any Pitch f/x data available for Pavano (too few pitches), but if he’s causing batters to swing at his pitches outside the zone at a fair clip I think it’s safe to assume his pitches have some decent life. If Pavano has re-worked his stuff to the point that he can fool batters consistently again, his lack of velocity becomes less of a concern (for comparison, Pavano’s average fastball velocity of 87.9 MPH is over 2 mph faster than Paul Byrd’s).

The renewed life on Pavano’s pitches and his aggressive nature are probably what Shapiro was referring to when he cited those seven starts. Shapiro also has a point in citing Pavano’s motivation to succeed in 2009. If this guy has any pride at all (athletes at this level usually do), he’ll be working his butt off to prove everyone (especially New York) wrong. The tools to achieve modest success are there, but Pavano’s health is going to have the final say no matter what.

Performance aside, I really can’t argue with the way Pavano’s contract is structured. Pavano’s one year contract guarantees him $1.5 million with another $5.3 million locked up in performance incentives. His incentives package is broken down by starts and innings, as described by Cot’s:

Starts: $0.1M each for 18, 20, 22; $0.2M each for 26, 28; $0.25M for 30; $0.3M for 32; $0.35M each for 33, 34; $0.4M for 35

Innings: $0.1M each for 130, 140, 150; $0.15M each for 160, 170; $0.2M for 180; $0.25M each for 190, 200, 210; $0.3M for 215; $0.4M for 225; $0.5M for 235

An easier way of reading it is if Pavano starts 20 games and averages 6 innings per start, he will earn an extra $0.1 million. If he were to average 6.5 innings over the same 20 starts, he’d earn just $0.2 million. Thirty starts (!) at 5.5 innings per and he’d earn $1.2 million in incentives.

Even if Pavano exceeds all expectations and starts 20 games for Cleveland, they’ll only be paying him about $1.6 million for his services. There’s a remote chance Pavano makes even 10-15 starts this season, but if there’s any chance that Cleveland could get some quality innings out of Pavano then it’s worth betting the $1.5 mil to see what happens. Many fans are comparing Pavano’s deal to the one-year contract Kevin Millwood had in 2005, but I don’t see much similarity beyond the structure of their contracts.

Millwood was guaranteed $3 million with up to $4 million in incentives, most of which focused on his ability to stay healthy (he would have lost money for each day spent on the DL). Millwood more than earned his keep that year by posting a 2.86 ERA, 1.21 WHIP, and 2.80 K/BB ratio over 192 IP. In addition to mentoring Sabathia and Lee on the finer points of pitching, Millwood finished sixth in AL Cy Young voting and won the AL ERA title. Plus, Millwood had averaged 34.5 starts, 219.5 IP, and a 114 ERA+ from 2002-2003 before succumbing to injury in 2004 and had a more reliable track record than Pavano ever did.

Cleveland is taking a shot in the dark with Pavano, since no one can draw any kind of reasonable conclusion as to whether he’ll be effective or healthy enough to even hold down a spot in the rotation. Shapiro has gone on record saying if Pavano is healthy, he will be guaranteed a spot in the rotation on Opening Day. What type of pitcher will show up in April is anybody’s guess, but I’m hoping for at least $1 million worth of quality innings until Westbrook is 100% healthy again. I have a feeling the Indians aren’t hoping for much more than that either. I suppose if Pavano can’t make it until July (Westbrook’s projected return), Plan B would be to see if one of the plethora of rookies sticks as a temporary starter.

I still have an uneasy feeling about Cleveland’s rotation, not unlike how I felt when Borowski was designated closer at the beginning of last season. There are just too many “ifs” involved right now. Lee can’t be expected to carry the rotation on his back all season, even after an outstanding Cy Young campaign. If anything, Cleveland should be vigilant about Lee’s workload and pitch action after he threw a career high 223.3 innings (Lee is also aware of this issue, ensuring extra training/recovery time by skipping the WBC).

Meanwhile, the 24-year old Carmona spent most of 2008 trying to get back on track after enduring a hangover from the 215 innings he logged in his sophomore season. I feel that Carmona’s ability to return to form is the key to Cleveland’s rotation this season, even more so than Lee. There’s little reason to think Lee won’t live up to his ace status with another strong season (even with the typical regression), but there is a lot of pressure on Carmona to bounce back and be a legitimate number two starter.

I really like Anthony Reyes’ upside, but he started just six games with Cleveland after a couple of rough seasons in St. Louis. Six starts is not a lot to go on, so it seems Cleveland is banking on his potential to breakout at age 26 in his new surroundings.

Aaron Laffey (93.7 IP, 105 ERA+) and Jeremy Sowers (121 IP, 80 ERA+) both struggled in Cleveland last season, although Sowers did bounce back in Buffalo with a 2.08 ERA, 1.20 WHIP, and 2.52 K/BB ratio over 60.2 innings (when has he not bounced back in Buffalo though?). Scott Lewis (4 GS, 24 IP) and Zach Jackson (16 GS, 92 IP) have limited experience as ML starters. Twenty three year old David Huff rounds out the group of young southpaws with a strong 2008 season in AAA, but no ML experience. There are no signs of Cleveland deviating from their plan to convert Adam Miller into a full-time bullpen arm, so he won’t be available as a starter in 2009.

I realize the five pitchers I just named are mostly under consideration for one rotation spot, although I would consider Pavano’s spot wide open as well. My point is that no one behind Lee and Carmona can truly be counted on to a.) pitch effectively for most of the season b.) stay healthy or c.) not pitch like a rookie who is in way over his head. Maybe I’m just being paranoid about the Tribe’s pitching after having to suffer through the heinous nightmare that was the 2008 bullpen. In my pessimistic opinion though, the starting rotation could be this year’s Achilles heel.

Fun Fact:

After the C.C. Sabathia trade on July 7, Cleveland finished the season with a 44-30 record (.594 WP), including a 10 game winning streak from August 17-27. A .594 WP on the season would have qualified for the AL wild card.

Scouting the FA Closers

As you probably know by now, Cleveland is shopping for a closer this off-season. The Tribe is looking to either sign or trade for an established closer, although their budget is not entirely clear. I felt that the best combination of reliability, experience, and value on the free agent market was Trevor Hoffman, which you can read about here. Cleveland supposedly talked with Hoffman, Fuentes, Rodriguez, and Jason Isringhausen. I was originally going to do a list of free agents and trade targets, but I think I’ll just round out the free agents Cleveland has an interest in and pick up on any trade rumors after the winter meetings (in case you were wondering, Matt Capps is at the top of my wish-list on that front).

2.) Kerry Wood

2008 Team: Cubs
Age: 31
Previous Contract: 1 yr / $4.2 mil (2008), plus up to $3.45 mil for performance bonuses

Player	SV (%)	IP	ERA	WHIP	ERA+	H/9	BB/9	K/9	K/BB
K. Wood	34 (85.0%)	66.1	3.26	1.09	137	7.33	2.44	11.40	4.67

As much as I hyped up Trevor Hoffman earlier, I think I’d be pretty happy if the team went with Kerry Wood instead. Wood is an interesting option considering he has 10 MLB seasons under his belt, but just completed his first as a closer. After logging 174, 213, and 211 innings as a starter from 2001 to 2003, Wood struggled to stay healthy. Between 2004 and 2006, Wood suffered from an array of injuries and underwent surgery on his knee and rotator cuff. The Cubs finally decided to try and conserve Wood's electric arm by converting him to a reliever in 2007. The relief stint got off to a rough start as Wood spent most of the season battling elbow issues (he did not return to Chicago until August). Wood expressed a strong preference to stay in Chicago, taking an incentives based $4.2 million dollar contract after filing for free agency after the 2007 season.

Wood would have been the perfect Shapiro project a year ago; battered by injuries with a high payoff when healthy. Wood's 2008 run as the Cubs closer jump-started the former ace's career and probably put him in line for a hefty raise. Wood officially hit the open market Monday after the Cubs declined to offer him arbitration. The Cubs have made it clear they are moving on without Wood, even though he has offered to take a one year deal to stay with the team. Chicago balked at Wood's supposed $9+ million salary and have already anointed Carlos Marmol as closer.

Wood's value significantly increased after 2008 due to his success as closer and the fact that he was able to stay healthy for the entire season. The only major setback for Wood was in July when he suffered from a blister on his right index finger and was placed on the 15-day DL. Wood isn't exactly a veteran closer, but he is a veteran starter. He has already proven that he has the mentality to handle the closer role and is a seasoned playoff pitcher. His 85.0% save percentage last year was comparable to elite closers like Joe Nathan (86.6%) and B.J. Ryan (88.8%).

Despite owning the lowest save percentage and highest ERA between Fuentes and Rodriguez, I would take Wood if all I had to go by were the numbers. Wood’s ERA was inflated by a few bad outings, particularly in July when he was probably trying to work around a blister on one of his throwing fingers. Other than the three isolated appearances where he gave up three runs and a bad stretch in September where he surrendered 7 runs in 3.1 innings, Wood was very reliable. He may have blown six saves, but three of those came before May 2. After that, all Wood did was rack up consecutive saves.

Wood’s H/9 rate was slightly higher than K-Rod and Fuentes, but Wood’s outstanding combination of a 2.44 BB/9 rate and 11.40 K/9 rate really puts him ahead of the competition. Even though he gave up more hits, Wood had the best WHIP, K/BB ratio, and HR/9 rate of the three. Wood’s combination of strikeouts and precision place him ahead of pack in terms of overall pitching ability and I feel that his numbers are fairly sustainable. Several stats seem likely to regress based strictly on Wood’s career totals, although I’m not sure it’s fair to directly compare his time as a starter to that as a reliever. If you consider Wood’s ability as a starter and remove all the pitfalls of starting (late inning fatigue, loss of focus, multiple ABs per batter, etc.) it seems very reasonable to think that Wood would see a significant improvement in performance if all of his effort were distilled down to just one or two innings per outing.

If Wood can stay healthy this season, there’s a strong chance he’ll be a lights-out closer.

While I'm not sure about the exact amount, I think his price per year will fall between Fuentes and Hoffman. I don't see him giving other teams the option of a one year deal like he offered to Chicago (that was motivated more by his own desire to stay in Chicago than anything else). If I were Wood's agent I would advise him to seek a three to four year deal given that this is his first real venture as a free agent and his history of injury. The 31 year old Wood may not have another shot at a big, multi-year contract depending on how his body holds up. It's not clear how heavily teams are weighing Wood's prior injuries (no pun intended), but if other GMs hesitate to sign him to three or four years Cleveland may step in with the next best thing.

Considering how important it is that Cleveland's closer be a consistent presence (read, healthy) this season, I'm not sure Wood is the best choice for Cleveland. Still, K-Rod has been deflecting rumors about the condition of his arm this off-season, while Trevor Hoffman is 41 years old. It’s tough to tell where Cleveland would rank Wood in terms of injury risk (you can bet someone is poring over his latest physical and 2008 tapes though). Personally, I think I’d take a chance on Wood if he could be had for a reasonable contract.

I could see Cleveland offering a two year guaranteed contract at $6-8 million per year, plus a team option, with another $2-3 million in incentives based on appearances and DL stints. Again, the market will likely dictate whether Wood ends up considering anything less than three years at $9-10 million per. Texas is rumored to be pretty high on Wood and has a history of burning money in free agency, so expect some stiff competition to drown out concerns about Wood's past injuries.

3.) Brian Fuentes

2008 Team: Colorado
Age: 33
Previous Contract: 1 yr / $5.05 mil (2008)

Player	SV (%)	IP	ERA	WHIP	ERA+	H/9	BB/9	K/9	K/BB
B. Fuentes	30 (88.2%)	62.2	2.73	1.10	168	6.75	3.16	11.78	3.73

Fuentes appears to be the Mets’ primary target right now. Based on Fuentes' scheduled meeting with the Mets in Vegas and how desperate New York is for a closer to replace the ailing Billy Wagner, I'd say Fuentes will be off the market before the Winter Meetings conclude. While Cleveland did express an interest in Fuentes, I don't see them getting into a bidding war with the Mets (never a good idea).

Fuentes managed to have the best season of his career in 2008 despite logging over half his innings in the Major’s third best hitters park (Coors Field). Below are his home/away splits for the past three seasons:

Brian Fuentes 2008 Season Splits

Location	Year	IP	ERA	WHIP	SLGA	K/BB
Home	2006	34.2	3.63	1.21	.410	4.44
	2007	31.1	1.72	0.83	.292	3.00
	2008	33.1	3.51	1.29	.357	4.80
Away	2006	30.2	3.23	1.11	.324	1.94
	2007	30.0	4.50	1.43	.350	2.13
	2008	29.1	1.84	0.89	.210	3.40

Finding success in Colorado as a pitcher is no easy task. You either face a thin-aired, slugger’s paradise at home or a foreign, hostile environment on the road. I guess it’s not that surprising that Fuentes’ home and away splits tend to fluctuate each year. I expected his ERA and SLGA to heavily favor his time at Coors, but if you take the past three seasons as a whole, there seems to be a rough equilibrium. In 2006, Fuentes posted similar numbers at home (3.63 ERA, 1.21 WHIP) and away (3.23 ERA, 1.11 WHIP). In 2007, he dominated batters at home (1.72 ERA, 0.83 WHIP), but got roughed up to the tune of a 4.50 ERA and 1.43 WHIP on the road. In his walk year, the splits reversed: stellar away (1.84 ERA, 0.89 WHIP), significantly less so at home (3.51 ERA, 1.29 WHIP).

Even Fuentes’ slugging against (SLGA) follows this pattern, although you’d expect opposing batters to consistently collect more extra base hits against him at Coors Field than in most other stadiums.

Fuentes’ overall performance as Colorado’s closer has been pretty solid, averaging 62.8 IP, 3.08 ERA, 1.12 WHIP, and 155 ERA+ over the past three seasons (his 78.7 save percentage represents some really shaky stretches in ’06 and ’07 though). The main thing I was curious about was if Fuentes would see a significant improvement in performance once he got away from Coors Field. Based on a rough analysis of his splits, I don’t think he’ll see any major improvements in the future, at least not due to a change of address. I don’t see Fuentes’ value slipping very much, but his 2008 season will probably go down as a career year for him.

Again, as long as his contract remains reasonable (unlikely) then Fuentes will provide an experienced, quality arm, but probably won’t meet the Mets’ expectations as closer based on his inability to dominate in high leverage situations on a consistent basis (career 80.0 SV%)

4.) Francisco Rodriguez

2008 Team: Anaheim
Age: 26
Previous Contract: 1 yr / $10 mil (2008)

Player	SV (%)	IP	ERA	WHIP	ERA+	H/9	BB/9	K/9	K/BB
F. Rodriguez	62 (89.8%)	68.1	2.24	1.29	198	7.11	4.48	10.14	2.26

I’m probably going to get torched for ranking Rodriguez near the bottom...oh well (not that my made-up “ranking” system ever meant anything).

The market seems to have cooled on Rodriguez and his record 62 saves. At one point, Rodriguez was seeking Mariano Rivera money (you know, 1.40 ERA, .66 WHIP, 39 saves for the umpteenth time in his career…that Rivera), or around $15 million a year on a long term contract. Amazingly, no one appears to have taken the bait and the hype surrounding Rodriguez is dim heading into the Winter Meetings.

Except for a 2.24 ERA and 62 saves, Rodriguez was only average in a direct comparison to Wood, Fuentes, and Hoffman. Rodriguez actually had the worst WHIP and K/BB ratio, which doesn’t make sense when paired with his sparkling ERA. At first glance, it looks like Rodriguez had quite a bit of luck on his side to allow so many baserunners with minimal damage. Let’s peel back another layer here:

2008 Closer FIPs

B. Fuentes: 2.24
K. Wood: 2.32
F. Rodriguez: 3.22
T. Hoffman: 3.99

Rodriguez’s FIP (Fielding Independent Pitching) is nearly a full point higher than Wood and Fuentes, which suggests he was getting a significant boost from his team’s defense and other factors beside his performance on the mound. Would Rodriguez be able to duplicate his 89.8 save percentage without improving his WHIP and BB/9 rate next season? Probably not.

Speaking of walks, 2008 marks the second consecutive season Rodriguez has seen his BB/9, H/9, and HR/9 rates rise, while his K/9 rate dropped. The rising walk rates and apparent decline in control may be a sign of some early wear and tear in Rodriguez’s throwing arm. Regardless of why these issues are popping up for the 26 year old flamethrower, allowing an exponential amount of baserunners and taters each year is going to catch up with him at some point (probably sooner than later if his K rate fails to rebound).

Another issue that may be causing reluctance amongst GMs is Rodriguez’s declining velocity. I wouldn’t have thought to look it up before (the kid throws hard), but Rodriguez has lost at least a MPH off his fastball every year since 2006. Rodriguez threw his heater 56% of the time with an average speed of 94.8 MPH. In 2008, he had cut back on his fastball usage by 5.3% and had an average speed of 91.9 MPH. The same can be said of his slider, which lost 4.6 MPH since 2006. To compensate, Rodriguez threw nearly twice as many changeups in 2008 as he had in the past.

Normally, a 26 year old whose fastball is his bread and butter wouldn’t have to compensate for lost velocity by mixing in a new pitch. It’s not the combination of the pitches so much as the timing (plus the declining K/BB rate). If I were talking to K-Rod’s agent about a long-term deal, that would be a major point of concern for me.

So why am I digging into Rodriguez when there are plenty of other flawed closers on the market? Well, I felt that Rodriguez was severely overrated in 2008 (Cy Young, are you kidding me?) and find it interesting how his breaking the saves record seemed to overshadow a few red flags (like the persistent drop in velocity). Anaheim has never been afraid to spend to retain a player. You have to wonder, what did they see that caused them to pass on Rodriguez?

Basically, I feel sorry for the team that signs Rodriguez to a four or five year deal because I think they’ll be lucky to get two good years out of him. Then again, maybe the abundance of closers and lack of spare change will see some GMs (not to name anybo-Sabean) show a bit of restraint this off-season.

No matter how scouts are interpreting the above trends, Rodriguez is one of the most important free agents this winter (Sabathia and Teixeira are the others), since he will set the precedent for every reliever’s contract after him.

And no, I don’t think Cleveland will make him a serious offer.

5.) Jason Isringhausen

2008 Team: St. Louis
Age: 35
Previous Contract: 3 yrs / $25.75 mil (2005-07), plus $8 mil club option (2008)

Player	SV (%)	IP	ERA	WHIP	ERA+	H/9	BB/9	K/9	K/BB
Isringhausen	12 (41.67%)	42.2	5.70	1.64	78	10.12	4.64	7.59	1.64

After seeing his name on the list of pitchers Cleveland is talking to, I was forced to take a closer look at Izzy. Overall, I think a return to form is a definite possibility for Isringhausen. I wouldn’t bet the bullpen on it, but certainly possible. That said, I hope Shapiro views Isringhausen as a sort of last resort (including trades) in case the market goes totally nuts or something.

Isringhausen is currently rehabbing from September elbow surgery to repair a torn tendon in his throwing arm. He should be 100% healthy by the time Spring Training arrives. The veteran closer will have plenty of motivation after suffering through his worst season since 1999 when he was traded from the Mets to the Athletics mid-season. His 2008 campaign was derailed by a series of injuries including a hand laceration (kids, don't punch a tv after you blow a save; water coolers are a much cheaper alternative), knee strain, tendonitis, and the torn tendon. To add insult to injury, Izzy had his closer status revoked (twice). Isringhausen probably would have retired if he had reached his goal of 300 saves last season (he needs seven more).

I'm convinced Isringhausen's ugly season can be blamed solely on his injuries and he could be a fairly productive closer in 2009. The trouble is, most of Isringhausen's past struggles were caused by injury issues. He got off to a terrible start in 2006 as well. After an erratic season, he finally succumbed to a hip injury in early September and was left off the Cardinal's post season roster (Adam Wainwright closed out the World Series victory). A newly repaired Isringhausen went on to have a career year in 2007, posting a 2.48 ERA, 1.07 WHIP, and 32 saves (93.7%) in 65.1 IP. Over his age 31-34 seasons (2004-2007), Isringhausen averaged 64.4 IP, 162 ERA+, 1.19 WHIP, 2.07 K/BB ratio, and an 84.8 save percentage (a couple good seasons, one great one, and one with a major injury, seems about right). At worst, Isringhausen is a top 15 closer (actually, at worst he's a top 15 closer on the DL) and at best he's a top 5. Which Izzy is going to show up in 2009? No idea.

Isringhausen is kind of like a watered down Kerry Wood (minus the filthy K rate): when he's healthy he can be very productive, but the risk of injury tends to run high. However, if I had to choose one injury prone closer over another, Wood is the obvious choice. One benefit of signing Isringhausen is that he'll probably have one of the friendliest free agent contracts of 2009. After expressing his desire to pitch again Isringhausen described his next contract as an "incentive-based thing." Izzy would make sense as a depth signing, but not as the full-time closer. Since he has clearly stated he wants to close, Isringhausen won't be signing with Cleveland.

All contract information was taken from Cot's Baseball Contracts.