Scott Lewis Sets Tribe Rotation

I'm still not sure what to make of Scott Lewis. With a grand total of eight starts between Buffalo and Cleveland last season, it's difficult to get a true bearing on how the 25-year old lefty will perform over an extended period in the Majors. Apparently, Tribe management has enough confidence in Lewis to grant him the final spot in the starting rotation in the closing weeks of Spring Training.

Lewis came into camp as a dark horse of sorts, forced to state his case against the experience of Aaron Laffey and Jeremy Sowers and the momentum of a then-healthy David Huff. My prediction at the beginning of camp was for Laffey to tighten his grip on a fifth rotation slot that was essentially his to lose with Huff settling in as the emergency starter in Columbus. I was excited about the prospect of either pitcher making it into the Tribe's rotation this season. Each southpaw features a different set of strengths, with Laffey relying heavily on groundball outs and Huff utilizing precise location and a diverse arsenal of pitches to fool batters.

I thought Laffey held an edge this time because his 143 innings in the Majors alone outpaced that of Huff's entire pro career (214 minor league innings). In a rotation with a rebounding Carmona, a rehabbing Pavano, and the occasionally fragile Reyes, Laffey's unique combination of experience and talent made him a stand-out amongst the youthful rotation candidates. With so much uncertainty in the rotation, Cleveland felt fairly confident in what to expect from Laffey at the highest level of competition. While Laffey has already made his debut, all signs point to Huff being Major League-ready as well.

The only real set-back Huff has experienced since college was an elbow injury that cost him part of the 2007 season. After showing no residual effects from the injury in 2008, Huff continued to tear through opposing batters as he made a smooth transition from Akron to Buffalo in his age 23 season. Huff finished 2008 with a 2.53 ERA, 0.96 WHIP, and 4.93 K/BB over a healthy 145.4 IP, punching his VIP ticket to Goodyear in the process. Clearly, Huff was ready for a new challenge in 2009. Unfortunately, Huff made it through just four innings in exhibition games before being shut down due to tendinitis in his left bicep. With flashbacks to the 2007 elbow issue resurfacing, Cleveland took the cautious route and shut-down the prized lefty for much of camp.

Huff may have missed out on an opportunity to impact the race for the fifth rotation spot, but Terry Pluto reports that Huff was back in action at minor league camp after a quick rebound from the bicep injury. According to Pluto, Huff has been totally locked in at camp, preventing any base runners from to advancing past first base over 12 IP until a Beau Mills tater left the park on Monday.

With Huff making an early exit, the competition came down to Laffey and Scott Lewis. Management was on-board with Laffey from the beginning and made it clear that the job was his to lose. Laffey reflected this sentiment, stating "I have that confidence that it's going to be my spot" entering the second week of March. Laffey had plenty of motivation heading into camp after being demoted to AAA in late July and struggling to regain his footing for the remainder of the 2008 season. He was outstanding in May, tossing 34 innings over five starts with a 0.79 ERA and 1.02 WHIP, but fell apart in June and July with a 6.24 ERA and 1.78 WHIP over 53.3 IP in 10 starts. Elbow tightness supposedly affected Laffey's control, leading to the inconsistent season.

The team tends to focus on many factors when evaluating a pitcher during the pre-season. Given how uneven the whole Spring Training experience is, from the lack of innings to the uneven quality of opposing lineups to the lingering effects of a long off-season, the usual performance stats are given minimal consideration in camp (Wedge claims he doesn't even look at stats during Spring Training). This amplifies the importance of a pitcher's current physical condition, preparation prior to each start, adjustments made on the fly, and composure under pressure along with pitch velocity and movement, control, and a consistent delivery. Even if a pitcher has a poor outing in the box score, the bottom line is the impression made on the coaching staff and general manager.

The lack of substantial innings makes a consistent execution of these things crucial to a pitcher trying to win a spot out of camp. A bad week by one player can provide enough of an opening for the competition to pull ahead. I think a lack of consistency was what cost Laffey the job that he had been favored to win. Even though the overall numbers between Laffey and Lewis are similar, Laffey was more erratic on the mound over those 13 innings. Here's how they compared through March 20:

Player	IP	ERA	WHIP	K/BB	GB/FB
S. Lewis	13.1	4.12	1.45	2.00	1.72
A. Laffey	13.0	6.92	1.46	2.25	2.50

In the team's opinion, Lewis looked more prepared for the start of the season than Laffey. Maybe Laffey was a little too relaxed in his approach and let a few of his exhibition starts get away from him or maybe a few of his bad habits from last season carried over into camp. Whatever the reason, Lewis out-pitched Laffey in what appears to be a minor upset as far as Spring Training competitions go.

Having Lewis start the season in Cleveland feels more like an extended tryout to me though. It's not so much that Lewis looks better right now, rather the team wants to gain some clarity on how big a role Lewis may play in the future. I haven't seen much to indicate the team is very confident in what to expect out of Lewis over an extended period. This could be their way of filling in some of the gaps on the depth chart by getting a better read on what they have in their rookie pitcher.

A similar scenario has played out in the past with Sowers in 2006. Sowers made his Major League debut against Cincinnati after a late June call-up. While he didn't blow away opposing batters, the then 23-year old was steady over his first 14 starts, compiling a 3.57 ERA, 1.18 WHIP, and 1.75 K/BB in 88.3 IP. Back-to-back complete game shutouts on the road on July 22 and 28 solidified his role in the starting rotation for the remainder of the season. Sowers started the 2007 season with Cleveland, but fell short of his previous effort with a 6.42 ERA over 13 starts (67.3 IP). He has struggled to secure a permanent starting job with Cleveland ever since.

Like Sowers, Scott Lewis made a splash in his debut, tossing 14 consecutive scoreless innings and winning all four of his starts. Lewis had a bit of a rough go in his final two starts against hard-hitting Detroit and Chicago (10 IP, 14 H, 4 HR, 7 ER), but finished with a 2.62 ERA and 2.50 K/BB ratio. Lewis' September stint in Cleveland no doubt aided his audition in February and March.

There are two key differences between the duel southpaw's debuts (besides a disparate number of starts). First, this isn't 2006 where the Tribe finished in fourth place with a 78-84 record (Todd Hollandsworth started in Sowers' debut, if that tells you anything). This squad is a playoff contender and doesn't have the luxury of testing rookie pitchers in uncharted waters purely for evaluation purposes. If the rookie is the best option on the roster, fine, but most of the starting rotation will already be on a short leash and Lewis should be no exception. Second, this team is loaded with starting pitching depth. If Lewis shows signs of being overwhelmed, fatigued, or unable to make the necessary adjustments Cleveland should make that call to Columbus without hesitation.

I expect Laffey to snap out of whatever mysterious funk he's been in lately and judging by what I've heard thus far, Huff could turn out to be the impact rookie for Cleveland this season (LaPorta or Brantley would have earned this designation if it weren't for the fact that the offense is the least of this team's problems). I still consider Sowers more of a secondary option behind Laffey and Huff, but given his quasi-veteran status and modest improvements from last season he may be higher up on Shapiro's speed-dial than I realize. My point is, Lewis will need to carry that Spring Training mentality into the regular season, since he'll be fighting to keep his job from Day 1.

Decisions made regarding the starting rotation in March may ultimately prove meaningless come June or July. I have a feeling the state of the rotation will remain fluid during the first half of the season as the health and effectiveness of Pavano, Reyes, and Lewis are tested in meaningful games. This could prove to be a blessing or a curse, depending on how the organization's vaunted depth handles the opportunity (think Juan Gonzalez's hammy in 2005). I have no idea what we'll see out of Scott Lewis, but I also know we haven't seen the last of Laffey and Huff this season.

Weather or Worry?

Terry Pluto provided an interesting quote from veteran pitcher Kerry Wood in a recent article addressing the troublesome weather conditions at Goodyear:

Not long after Cliff Lee was spanked for seven runs in five innings Wednesday, Tribe closer Kerry Wood said there are real reasons why pitchers complain it's hard to grip and throw the baseball in Arizona's dry, desert air.

"It sometimes feels like baby powder [is on the ball]," said Wood.

Those words came just after Wood threw a 1-2-3 sixth inning, whiffing two.

Pluto points out that "not every Tribe pitcher has been hit hard this spring," citing the success of Fausto Carmona, Carl Pavano, Anthony Reyes, and Jensen Lewis in the desert environment (although Fausto could probably pitch in a snowstorm and still manage to find the the strike zone). Personally, I'm not buying the lack of humidity as a real excuse. The same issue pops up at many West Coast locales and during frigid night games early and late in the season. If a pitcher doesn't know how to deal with the ambient air conditions by now, they're going to run into trouble at some point.

Cliff Lee brushed off the "dry ball" issue as just another excuse, but Scott Lewis...not so much. I'm probably being a bit harsh, but an athlete at that level really needs to be aware of how the environment can affect his performance on the field. High winds blowing the ball towards the fence are one thing; no way to control that. But blaming a wild start on the lack of humidity?

Lewis got jacked up in his last two tune-ups (6.2 IP, 21 H, 15 ER, 6 HR), so hopefully he was able to learn something from those beat-downs beyond "use more rosin." Otherwise, he's going to have a tough time pitching in the cold, dry months of the season.

No Masa?

Spring Training numbers typically don't mean much for veteran players. For reliever Masahide Kobayashi, an exceptionally poor showing this spring has placed his future with Cleveland in a precarious position. Kobayashi has been rocked just about every time he's taken the mound this offseason, surrendering 8 earned runs on 11 hits in only five innings of work. Masa's 14.40 ERA is by far one of the worst among the Tribe's returning relief pitchers and is only a few tenths of a point better than Tomo Ohka's (he was cut last week). In fact, the only reliever with a worse Spring ERA and at least four IP is Eddie Mujica and I don't like his chances of making the team despite being out of minor league options.

ERA isn't everything in March though, just ask team ace Cliff Lee, proud owner of a freshly minted Cy Young award and an 18.89 ERA in his 6.2 innings so far. What's put Kobayashi in Wedge's doghouse is how ineffective he has looked during camp. Some pitchers get rocked because they're trying to practice a certain pitch against live batters, like Lee and his intentionally fastball-heavy outing against Texas. Others display good velocity or action on their pitches, but don't quite have the complete package ready for Opening Day. Those pitchers typically don't have to deal with much additional pressure from the coaching staff.

I haven't had a chance to see Masa throw this offseason, but the few reports I've heard mention some minor inconsistencies with his delivery and a difficulty in keeping the ball down in the zone. With so many pitchers vying for work in the exhibition games, Kobayashi hasn't had much of an opportunity to act on what pitching coach Carl Willis and company are telling him. Even if Masa's five innings were ugly, they're still only five innings.

Fortunately for Kobayashi, he still has a lot of time to make adjustments during this year's extended Spring Training. As the Major League roster continues to get trimmed there should also be more opportunities for Masa as well. A strong rebound over the final 12 Cactus League games against increasingly more difficult lineups (starters will begin to see more at-bats as the season approaches) will go a long way in regaining some semblance of confidence in Kobayashi from Wedge.

It's still too early to decide Kobayashi's fate, but all he has to do is work out the kinks in his delivery over the next three weeks. He was guaranteed a roster spot heading in and I'd be surprised if Cleveland cut him from the team unless his pitching totally fell off a cliff. Even then, I think a more likely destination would be the disabled list to start the season.

Assuming Kobayashi is healthy (I have my doubts, but Masa says he's fine) his struggles in March are a legitimate concern. The whole point of Cleveland limiting him to six innings in the last two months of the 2008 season was so he'd be ready for 2009. Well, the 2009 season is almost here and Masa is still throwing like the same guy who posted a 10.32 ERA and 2.47 WHIP over 11.1 IP after the All Star break (small sample size, I know, but those numbers are still pretty representative of how bad he actually was). I still believe that Masa just ran out of steam in the second half of last season. I don't even think there was a serious injury involved, Kobayashi just seemed fatigued half-way through his first Major League season.

Regular readers are probably familiar with my take on Kobayashi by now and I'm still very confident that the transition between NPB and MLB is at the root of Kobayashi's struggles. The NPB regular season has only 144 games compared to the 162 for MLB. Combine the longer season with more stressful outings because of the superior hitters and tougher lineups and you can see how the workload can pile up quickly on a 34 year old rookie.

It's possible Cleveland underestimated the toll this transition would take on Kobayashi over the course of an entire season given his age. I'm not sure there was any way Cleveland could have predicted Kobayashi's struggles though; he is the exception rather than the rule. Most Japanese pitchers who cross the pond do so late in their career, especially relievers. Hideo Nomo and Daisuke Matsuzaka are rare cases in that they began their Major League careers at a relatively young age (both were 26). Below are four Japanese pitchers who experienced at least modest success in the Majors.

Pitcher	Team	Season (Year)	Age	IP (GS)	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
S. Hasegawa	ANA	Rookie (1997)	28	116.7 (7)	0	1.80	3.93	1.40	119
	SEA	Best (2003)	34	73.0	16	1.77	1.48	1.09	291
		Career	--	720.3	33	1.68	3.71	1.32	124
Pitcher	Team	Season (Year)	Age	IP (GS)	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
K. Sasaki	SEA	Rookie (2000)	32	62.7	37	2.51	3.16	1.16	145
	SEA	Best (2002)	34	60.7	37	3.65	2.52	1.05	168
		Career	--	223.3	129	3.14	3.14	1.084	138
Pitcher	Team	Season (Year)	Age	IP (GS)	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
H. Okajima	BOS	Rookie (2007)	31	69.0	5	3.70	2.22	0.971	214
	BOS	Best (2007)	32	62.0	1	2.60	2.61	1.16	177
		Career	--	131.0	6	3.07	2.40	1.06	195
Pitcher	Team	Season (Year)	Age	IP (GS)	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
T. Saito	LAD	Rookie (2006)	36	78.3	24	4.65	2.07	0.906	217
	LAD	Best (2007)	37	64.3	39	6.00	1.40	0.715	327
	LAD	Career	--	189.7	81	4.71	1.95	1.19	229

Note that Shigetoshi Hasegawa was the only one to break into the Majors before the age of 30. Interestingly enough, Hasegawa went on to post his best overall season at the age of 34 resulting in an appearance in the All Star game and an ERA+ of 291. Kaz Sasaki and Takashi Saito debuted at ages 32 and 36 respectively and have multiple seasons as top-shelf closers on their resumes. Hideki Okajima developed into an elite setup man for Boston in his rookie season and boasts a 2.14 postseason ERA over 16 games. There is certainly a precedent for Japanese relievers achieving success at the Major League level after the age of 30.

The reason I was so excited about Masa's rookie season was because I thought Cleveland had landed an Okajima or a Sasaki; a veteran reliever whose dominance in the Nippon Pro league would translate well in the Majors. Kobayashi's 227 saves are the most all-time by a Japanese player (Sasaki has the second-most) and he finished with a career 2.79 ERA over nine seasons. Kobayashi's career in Japan was every bit as good or better than the other relievers listed above. But unlike his fellow Japanese All Stars, Masa was merely average with the Tribe. Why did Masa struggle where similar Japanese rookies thrived?

Pitcher	Age	IP	SV	K/BB	ERA	WHIP	ERA+
M. Kobayashi	34	55.7	6	2.50	4.53	1.41	98

Even though each Japanese rookie had to deal with a similar increase in innings, Masa was the only one who failed to reach at least 60 innings, having only been effective for about 50 innings. It's difficult to say how much of this can be corrected the second time around through better conditioning and an improved knowledge of how the full season tends to play out. This is why Kobayashi's lackluster spring is such a concern. The team gave shut him down last season with the expectation that he would be ready to go for 2009, but this has not been the case. Instead, Kobayashi is still exhibiting some of the symptoms he suffered from before, although minor improvements have supposedly been made as of late.

According to Manager Eric Wedge, "this is a time when you need to see some performance to have an idea of what you can count on." Wedge is expecting to see significant improvement out of Masa heading into April or he may have to start drawing up a contingency plan. Eating Kobayashi's $3 million, guaranteed contract is certainly a possibility for Cleveland.

Aaron Fultz was owed $1.5 million entering the 2008 season, but was cut from the team in mid-March. Fultz surrendered 11 ER, 16 H, and 3 BB in 8 1/3 IP during Spring Training and looked so bad the team decided to pay him not to pitch for them. Given that Kobayashi's contract is worth twice as much and there is still a lot of time for evaluation before the season starts, I don't think the team has seriously considered cutting him yet.

I think the best approach would be to give Masa as much time as possible to improve and leave him on the 25-man roster to start the season. If he gets shelled in April and May with little hope of improvement, then the team should set him loose. They're on the hook for the $3 mil either way, so they might as well see what they have by testing him in meaningful innings first. While seeing the $3 million get flushed away would be disappointing, Masa's replacement would likely be playing for a minimum salary.

With all the talented relievers waiting in the minors, Cleveland could receive a significant upgrade to their bullpen and only have to pay another $400,000. Some of these prospects have a real shot at sticking in the Majors right now.

My pick for an early call-up to replace Kobayashi is Tony Sipp. Sipp appears to be fully recovered from Tommy John surgery and had a stellar showing in camp. The 24 year-old southpaw gave up only 3 H and 1 ER with 5 K and no walks over 4 IP, earning loads of praise from the coaching staff. Sipp has long been a highly touted prospect in the Tribe's system and word on the street is that he could make a positive impact in Cleveland. Kobayashi wasn't going to see any high-leverage innings anyway, so slotting in a rookie instead would leave the bullpen hierarchy intact.

I tend to view Sipp in a similar lens to Adam Miller in that they're both high-ceiling flamethrowers who have been derailed by injuries. Miller was a lock for the final spot in the bullpen, but complications with a finger ligament in his throwing hand have put his entire career in doubt. If Miller were healthy, now would have been the time to test him in the Majors. Now that Sipp is healthy, should the team afford him a similar opportunity? Maybe not, since Sipp was reassigned to the minors in the last round of cuts. I think he proved that he is healthy though and impressed enough people to be on the short list in case an extra reliever is suddenly needed.

Assuming the team breaks camp with seven relievers, Zach Jackson appears to be the leading candidate for the final spot as a long man, rounding out a pen that includes Kerry Wood, Rafael Perez, Jensen Lewis, Joe Smith, Rafael Betancourt, and Kobayashi.

Thoughts on the WBC

I started writing this the other night with an eye towards the MLB scoreboard as the Netherlands continued to give the Dominican Republic more than they could handle. Unfortunately, I didn't have MLB.tv or ESPN Deportes (the only available broadcasts), so I was limited to the basic numbers detailing the scoreless duel playing out in San Juan. Normally, this sort of attentiveness to a slowly updated boxscore is reserved for Indians games, at which point I realized just how compelling the World Baseball Classic has become.

The inaugural Classic in 2006 may have benefited from the novelty of seeing the first global tournament featuring professional players. The 2009 tournament lacks that newness, but it still feels just as fresh and engaging as before. Granted, I'm probably not representative of the average fan in terms of my interest in baseball (exhibit A: this blog). However, I'd rather watch a competitive international match than a random regular season game between two neutral teams. Why is that?

As an American baseball fan with television coverage limited to NCAA and MLB, the WBC is as close to the international game as I can get. International competition was practically non-existent to the majority of U.S. fans before the WBC. Unless you subscribe to a special sports television package, chances are you won't be seeing much of the Caribbean or Asia Series. Both tournaments boast Major League talent playing for their respective countries but only feature Latin American or East Asian ball clubs. Until recently, the United States, Canada, and other countries did not have a tournament that allowed their professional players to participate. Of the two major venues open to the U.S. and Canada, neither accommodates professional talent.

Baseball has been played in the Pan American games since 1951, but the event fell out of favor with the U.S. media and fans long ago. Plus, Cuba's ability to field professional-caliber players against an amateur field isn't exactly fair. The Cubans have taken 12 of the 15 gold medals awarded for baseball.

Olympic baseball is in danger of disappearing altogether. In what appeared to be a purely political move, the IOC voted to drop softball and baseball from the 2016 Olympics. Part of this decision may lie in the IOC's desire for MLB to suspend its season to provide Pro players the opportunity to attend the Olympics. Obviously, MLB declined. I can't say I blame MLB for snubbing the IOC, it's not like baseball has ever gotten much respect from them in the first place. Unlike hockey, baseball has only been a medal sport since 1992, so the working relationship is not as strong. Also, the consequences of a ML player getting injured away from his team in mid-season would have been too severe for the Commissioner to justify.

Unlike hockey or basketball, the Olympic version of baseball is (was) a hollow representation of the sport and is not a true representation of a country's talent. Sure, the sense of national pride is there anytime Team USA takes the field, but the competition itself is not anywhere near the level of other venues.

The international flavor of the WBC also differs from that of Major League baseball itself. On the one hand, baseball has become so diverse that the 25-man roster of any ML team can have up to five or six-plus countries represented. From Colombia to Taiwan, 18 countries currently boast a player at the Major League level. Baseball has grown from America's national past-time to a truly global sport. The abundance of cultures, nationalities, and playing styles that that have left their mark in the Majors only serves to enrich the sport further.

On the other hand, Pro ball is a business and often lacks the outright commitment and passion evident when national pride is on the line. Instead of playing for a paycheck, players are in it for their country. How often do you see multi-millionaire athletes standing on the dugout steps, clapping and shouting at the top of their lungs like a bunch little leaguers cheering on their teammates? Players tend to wear their competitive spirits on their sleeves in these tournaments. It may be an old cliche, but international play is the ultimate example of playing for the name on the front of the jersey rather than just the one on the back.

Think about it. Do you really think a young pitcher from Latin America cares as much about the Mid-Western city stitched onto his jersey as the fans do? Probably not, though I certainly wouldn't fault him for it. I'm not talking about the commitment and comradery gained from playing for one's teammates or organization, those are two entities that every athlete should feel some attachment to. My point is, most players probably don't have a particularly strong bond with the region their current team happens to play for (this applies to every player, not just those born outside the U.S.). It's not uncommon to hear a free agent heap praise on his old team's hometown, only to bolt for a bigger payday regardless of whatever feigned loyalty he professed.

When that same pitcher wears República Dominicana across his chest, you better believe he feels what the fans feel, only amplified. It's a different level of motivation when your fellow countrymen are the fans cheering in the stands and at home. When that flag is on the sleeve the competitive drive in every player kicks into top gear be it a minor leaguer, journeyman, or All-Star. This is why a match between Japan and Korea rivals a Yanks-Sox game in intensity, why the prized piece of Jake Peavy's memorabilia collection is his Team USA jersey, why the Venezuelan team has endured the disappointment of a nation for three years, and why even an anonymous Dutch team can topple a seasoned Dominican roster that would rival any All-Star team.

None of the events named earlier boast all the elements that give the WBC so much potential. The WBC is the highest quality baseball ever played in a global tournament, combining the drama and skill of the regular season with a determination and enthusiasm normally reserved for October, all on an international stage. In addition to providing fans everywhere with a united rooting interest every four years, the WBC serves as the flagship for MLB's attempt to grow the game in non-traditional locales. The Classic is both a proving ground and spotlight for countries still trying to define their own baseball programs.

This year's games point to significant improvements out of Italy, Australia, and the Netherlands. Italy now has multiple prospects in the low minors and knocked out a Canadian team that almost took down the United States. Australia hung tough with Cuba in a 5-4 loss and beat-down a talented Mexican team in a 17-7, eight inning rout. Of course, the Netherlands stole the show by upsetting the Dominican Republic not once, but twice in the same round. Even if they get knocked out in the next round, those wins will go down as two of the biggest upsets in the history of international play.

The players on the Dominican squad will feel the sting of their elimination for a long, long time. The so-called "Republic of Baseball" is not used to losing, especially to a team with only two active Major League players on its roster compared to 23 for the Dominicans. Manager Felipe Alou meant business following his team's first loss of the tournament: "That was a team that we should've shut out. It was a hard-fought game, but now they are going to brag about having beaten the Dominican Republic."

Shortstop Jose Reyes dismissed the Dutch altogether stating "we're way better than them" following his team's 3-2 loss on Saturday. I doubt anyone would argue with Reyes on this point (even the Dutch players admitted as much), which makes the loss even more shocking. One of the best teams in the tournament simply got out-played and out-hustled by a club with far less raw talent. With a bit of luck, a timely error from the Dominicans, and the simple fact that they wanted it more, the Netherlands pulled off the win.

The real impact will be on public interest in baseball in the Netherlands. The sport itself has been played on the European mainland and the Caribbean islands for some time, but has never experienced a win of this magnitude. According to pitching coach Bert Blyleven (one of four Dutch-born pitchers to reach the Majors) the 11th inning, come-from-behind victory was "as exciting as winning a World Series." The success of the national team should cause a wave of interest among kids looking to pick up the sport, especially in the Caribbean territories where most of the Dutch players are from. With a solid foundation in place, the Netherlands could see a surge in baseball talent in the near future as a direct result of the WBC.

The WBC still has its share of problems to address before it can really take flight. Many of the game's top players declined to participate due to a lack of interest or a legitimate fear of injury prior to Opening Day. MLB will have to tread carefully in how it encourages players to participate in the future. The event will need the draw of players like Pujols, Sizemore, and Sabathia meaning a balance will need to be struck at some point. A better product on the field leads to higher quality games which should continue to attract more fans and ensure the WBC's viability.

The highest priority must still be given to protecting the participants, since no one involved wants to see a team's ace get hurt in an exhibition game, no matter how meaningful it may be.

The timing of the WBC makes it tricky to protect pitchers from injury without significantly handicapping the games themselves. Coaches and pitchers alike haven't exactly been thrilled with the idea of front-loading innings to an already grueling season either. Stricter pitch counts were implemented in 2009 to protect pitchers still making the transition from the offseason to the starting rotation. Moving the event to after the World Series does not seem to be a viable option since there is a heavy risk in overloading an already tired arm at the end of the season. In terms of generating buzz for the sport, holding the WBC as a lead-in to the regular season seems to make the most sense.

Hopefully, the four-year lapse between each WBC will help keep the event fresh and satisfy some of the critics who say it's too disruptive to the regular season.

Finally, fan interest in the U.S. market has to be sustained for MLB to continue running the WBC.

The WBC fills a sort of niche market for American baseball fans; the reality of a professionally staffed "Dream Team" competing against other countries is new to USA baseball. This niche has already been filled in other countries by events like the Asian Series, Caribbean Series, and domestic leagues in Japan, Korea, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and elsewhere. Other countries have a league to call their own, populated by native players and cited as a measuring stick and source of pride for a nation's baseball talent. U.S. fans have always had a different perspective on baseball, since the primary league people follow here consists not just of the best players from the United States, but around the world.

I think the WBC has the potential to evolve into the premier championship in baseball, second only to the MLB playoffs. If an event like this can produce great games with a playoff atmosphere in March (the Canada - U.S. match on Saturday was epic) and inspire more people around the world to play or follow baseball, I think that's more than enough reason to keep it alive. The WBC may not be perfect, but if this year's surprises are any indication, baseball fans have a lot to look forward to down the road.

Hafner's Return Could Propel Offense to Elite Level

Is it possible that Cleveland is a sleeper team in 2009? The Tribe is coming off a forgettable season where the only thing they clinched in the last week of the season was a .500 record. A terrible bullpen, injuries, trades, and on and on (you know the story, I'm not going to dredge through it again). Last season, Cleveland was viewed as a serious World Series contender with every key player from the ALCS championship squad returning. This season, Cleveland has managed to stay under the radar. Even Baseball Prospectus' projections have set the bar low for 2009, awarding Cleveland and their 84-78 record the AL Central by default after handing every other team a losing record.

Many analysts have passed off Cleveland as a flawed team in a weak division, ceding the AL Pennant to one of three teams in the East. The main hang-up for most people seems to be the starting pitching. Personally, I'm liking the possibility of Lee, Carmona, Huff, Laffey, and Westbrook more and more (how long it takes that rotation to shape up is another matter). So what if we didn't re-sign Sabathia? How many Cy Youngs has the rest of the American League won the last two years? It's Carmona's turn to win the CY this year anyway.

As long as the Tribe can get solid innings out of their top three starters, I think the array of young arms will fall into place to fill out the rest of the rotation. While there may be risk in riding the bullpen too heavily, this relief corps has the potential to dominate the final three innings. The depth and strength of the bullpen could go a long way in smoothing the anticipated speed bumps in carrying so many young hurlers in the rotation. Taken as a whole, the team's pitching is shaping up to be good enough to contend. I certainly wouldn't view it as a liability, not with Lee, Carmona, and Wood leading the charge.

If Cleveland can get any kind of quality pitching this season, I feel that they are primed to do much more than just stumble into the playoffs. Cleveland has its flaws and risks, but they also have the tools to cover any potential holes effectively. In this case, the offense may be a secret weapon of sorts.

In 2007, the Tribe posted a team wOBA of .335 and finished 6th in the AL in runs scored with 811. The following year, Cleveland nearly matched this effort with a .334 wOBA and a 6th best 805 runs scored, despite missing the production of a healthy Hafner and Martinez for the entire season. I was surprised to see such a narrow gap in overall offensive production between 2007 when the offense seemed to fire on all cylinders, and 2008 when it felt like the lineup just couldn't be trusted on any given day. Amazingly, Wedge was able to squeeze some sort of production from the 110 different lineups utilized in 2008 (compared to a more stable 81 in 2007). At some point, out of the 166 at-bats given to Dellucci at DH (second only to a limited Hafner), a nasty sophomore slump from Asdrubal, a .753 OPS out of the starting first baseman, and the fact that the backup catcher had more home runs than the third baseman and two primary DH's combined, Cleveland was only six runs off the pace from a year ago.

Cleveland Team Offense: 2006-2008

Year	OBP	SLG	OPS	wOBA	Team RS (AL Rank)	Team RA	Run Diff.
2006	.349	.457	.806	.346	870 (2nd)	782	88
2007	.343	.428	.771	.335	811 (6th)	704	107
2008	.339	.424	.763	.334	805 (6th)	761	44

Obviously nothing's for certain, but I think Cleveland has a shot at cracking the top three in runs scored again. Cleveland didn't have to sign any big names to improve their offense, all they needed was to get healthy and watch the capabilities of their in-house players continue to grow. Peralta had his best season since 2005, finishing second among AL shortstops in wOBA and first in HR (or 4th among third basemen, depending on how you view him). I'm fairly confident that 2008 was no fluke for Peralta and he will continue to be one of the team's best hitters.

A renewed Victor Martinez will anchor the middle of the order once again, relegating Garko's disappointing bat to the bench. If Sizemore is the sparkplug for the offense, Martinez represents the pistons (I'm not very good with analogies). Getting back the captain and team batting champ for three of the past four seasons will obviously provide a huge boost to the offense and give Wedge one less unknown to deal with when structuring the lineup.

This may finally be the year we see Martinez shift into more of a platoon, or even backup role in catching. Shoppach has earned the right to be an everyday starter and with Martinez at first base most of the time, Shoppach will have the opportunity to build on his AL-leading .517 slugging percentage among catchers. A healthy Martinez at first base improves the team on both offense (fewer AB's for Garko, more for Shoppach) and defense (Shoppach is above average behind the dish).

Shin-Soo Choo is a bit of a wild card in that he's never been healthy and had a starting gig at the same time. Choo played out of his mind last season, posting 28 doubles, 14 homers, and an elite .946 OPS over 370 PA. I'm being cautiously optimistic about Choo, since there's a slim chance he'll produce those types of numbers over a full season without a big dose of luck. It's difficult to determine what Choo will actually do as a starter, since his only two Major League stints with at least 150 PA had deceiving BABIP's attached to them. In 2006, Choo had an .812 OPS in 179 PA with a .394 BABIP, while his 2008 BABIP was .373. That's an awfully high occurrence of balls falling in for hits. For comparison, Manny Ramirez had a .373 BABIP to go with his 1.031 OPS last season.

Then again, one thing I've heard multiple times about Choo is how good he is at driving the ball to the gap. It'd be great if I was wrong, but I doubt Choo is capable of posting Manny numbers consistently. With the exception of his SLG, Choo's Major (.291/.377/.493) and Minor (.301/.388/.460) league lines match up nicely. A more reasonable expectation could be for Choo to land somewhere around an .870 OPS (CHONE only has him at .800, but this seems low). Even if he experiences a steep regression, Choo will still be wielding a very strong bat.

Combine the above with Mark DeRosa's OBP in the two-hole, an anticipated rebound from Cabrera, and LaPorta and Brantley in reserve (I'm counting down the days until we cut Dellucci and one of these guys gets the call) and the pieces for a potent offense start to fall into place. Besides Tampa Bay, does any other AL team stand to improve on offense as much as Cleveland? Boston got slightly worse after Manny left, New York added Texiera while the rest of the team continues to age (although they've compensated for this by buying a new pitching staff), and no one in the Central has made any major changes. On paper, Cleveland's offense is flat-out dangerous.

In order to reach their full potential as a truly elite offense, the Tribe will need a come-back season from Travis Hafner. Cleveland was unable to find a suitable replacement for the ailing Hafner last season, finishing with the third worst DH production in the AL. The offense was able to tread water because of unexpected contributions from the likes of Choo and Shoppach, but the lack of an effective DH will only cause more grief for Cleveland. Production from the DH spot has declined steadily right along with the health of Hafner's shoulder.

Cleveland DH Production

Year	HR	OBP	SLG	OPS	wOBA (Rank)	wRC (Rank)
2006	45	.409	.600	1.009	.418 (1st)	136 (2nd)
2007	25	.384	.453	.837	.359 (5th)	102 (5th)
2008	17	.325	.390	.715	.311 (12th)	72 (12th)

It's no coincidence that the team scored 870 runs (second only to New York's 930) the last time Hafner was truly healthy in 2006. Hafner had a career year in '06, slugging 42 HR with a 179 OPS+. The 2007 season saw a steep decline across the board for Hafner and while he was still effective at driving in runs from the three-hole, the apparent discomfort and lack of pop in Hafner's swing foreshadowed the elbow and shoulder injuries that would plague him throughout 2008.

Even with a sub-par 2007 season compared to his 2005-2006 run, Hafner provided quality production and was still among the top five DH's in the league. Hafner's erratic performance turned out to be more than just a slump though and the pain in his shoulder only grew more pronounced once he returned to action in April 2008. In an interview with Anthony Castrovince, Hafner admitted that "[he'd] go out to have a meal and [the] shoulder would burn just from eating, it would wear [the] shoulder out." Even a simple weight lifting routine became an epic undertaking.

After three months on the disabled list trying to strengthen his right shoulder, Hafner returned to Major League action in September only to have the pain and limited mobility return. Hafner had arthroscopic surgery as soon as the season ended to clean out the shoulder joint. To make sure the effects of the surgery stuck, Hafner took up a new training regimen this offseason. He reportedly lost 10 pounds and developed a leaner upper-body in an effort to boost his bat speed to its former level.

When dealing with an injury this severe (he must have been really hurting if he couldn't even lift a fork without pain), odds are the effects were present well before the start of the 2008 season. Only time will tell how much of Hafner's 2007 season was connected to the lingering effects of his slowly weakening shoulder, but there had to have been some serious issues that were either chalked up to a slump, annual wear and tear, or were misdiagnosed in some way. I'm encouraged by the fact that the main problem turned out to be the shoulder and not the chronic right elbow that has troubled Hafner in the past. Hopefully this is the first and last time Hafner has a problem with the shoulder now that it's been surgically repaired.

I'm not ignoring the fact that Hafner's doctor was unable to point to a specific source for the shoulder issues. However, since I wouldn't know how to interpret a more detailed medical report even if I had one, the best I can do is to trust the team's judgement here. Hafner was well into his 2007 slump before the team offered him a long-term contract extension. Why would Cleveland do that if they knew Hafner had even a hint of something that could render him ineffective down the road? It's one thing to have leverage over a slumping player, it's another to take such a significant risk purely for the sake of said leverage. Given how cautious the franchise is about committing salary and how thorough team physicals supposedly are, it doesn't make any sense for Cleveland to willingly give $57 million to a guy with a potentially chronic, debilitating injury.

I think we've heard the last of Hafner's shoulder issues. Hafner isn't the type of player content with just collecting a paycheck on the DL, he's extremely competitive and seems to take it personally when he can't contribute to the team. How often do you hear of a designated hitter committing to a new offseason conditioning program? The dedication and work ethic are there, but Cleveland had better hope they were correct about Hafner's health when they signed him to that extension. The financial repercussions from a $47 million, lame-duck DH would be severe for a small-market team like Cleveland.

Reports out of Goodyear have Hafner making steady progress with his hitting program. Hafner's surgery rehab schedule caused him to come into Spring Training a week or two behind his teammates, relegating him to the indoor batting cages until he became comfortable swinging a bat again. After passing the test with several successful outings at regular batting practice Hafner may get the green light to play in Friday's exhibition game against Milwaukee. In the meantime, he sparred with Cliff Lee in a simulated game, marking the first time Hafner has faced live pitching at camp.

Tribe skipper Eric Wedge indicated modest expectations for the lefty slugger. Unlike in the past, Hafner won't be expected to lead the offense. It's crucial that the coaching staff keeps Hafner on an even keel (to borrow another Wedgism) so that he doesn't press and start to dig himself a hole early on. Being healthy will go a long way in boosting his confidence, but the biggest obstacle to overcome in getting back on track could actually be Hafner himself if he tries to do too much right away.

If the re-acclimation process goes slowly for Hafner, Cleveland will have plenty of backup until he can adjust. A likely scenario is that Wedge starts Hafner out lower in the order and allows him to work his way up as he (hopefully) continues to get stronger. Plan B would be to have Garko platoon at DH temporarily. Look for Choo and Peralta to pick up the slack in the fourth and fifth spots behind Martinez. Actually, here's what I would expect to be the Opening Day lineup:

1.) Sizemore (L)

2.) DeRosa (R)

3.) Martinez (S)

4.) Choo (L)

5.) Peralta (R)

6.) Hafner (L)

7.) Shoppach (R)

8.) Francisco (R)

9.) Cabrera (S)

I've always been a fan of Wedge's "one through nine" approach to running the offense and I think this mantra will be more prevalent than ever. If all (or even most) goes according to plan, there will be few easy outs from top to bottom. The offense still doesn't have much speed (although Choo, Francisco, and Cabrera at least provide options for the occasional steal, hit & run, etc. beyond just Sizemore), but much of the lineup can still rake the ball. Cleveland finished second in the AL in doubles last year with 339 and has had at least seven players in double-digit homer figures the past two seasons. They could have easily had a second straight year with at least five 20-homer players if Choo and Martinez had played a full season.

The fact that the Tribe's power numbers tend to come from unorthodox positions (like catcher and center field) and are more evenly distributed throughout the lineup will help siphon more pressure away from the former team leader in homers. Doubles and walks should be the basis of Hafner's attack. If he can regain his patience at the plate and make solid contact the home runs should come naturally with that punishing left-handed swing.

Again, perhaps the best news for both Hafner and Cleveland is that he doesn't have to have a monster season for it to be considered a success (yes, I know how much he's getting paid, but I think the team is more concerned with him using this season to fully re-establish himself for the remainder of his contract). Likewise, the team doesn't need to rely on him producing a .300 average with 40 taters to achieve a potent offense. Both Bill James and CHONE project Hafner a bit worse than I expect him to be, but it's possible I'm being overly optimistic in the first place. Based on my imaginary projection system I could see Hafner finishing with 29 HR, 90 BB, .288 AVG, .400 OBP, .490 SLG, and an .890 OPS. Since I basically just estimated that from his 2005 and 2007 seasons off the top of my head, I wouldn't take that prediction to your fantasy draft. Still, I don't think an .890 OPS is out of the question for 2009.

The bottom-line for Hafner this season will be how he fits into the offense as a whole. If he is able to drive in 100 runners and draw 80-100+ walks like he has in the past I would consider that a very strong season coming off a serious injury. Who knows, maybe he'll surprise everyone and this will be the year Pronk returns.

Francisco vs. Dunn

It's no secret that the free agent market has been down this off-season, leaving many All-Star caliber players unemployed in the first week of February. Teams have been more cautious about adding to their payrolls and handing out long-term contracts than in the past due to the uncertainty brought on by the economy. Without a reliable revenue stream from the fans, merchandising, and corporate sponsors, most teams have limited their free agent acquisitions to one or two year deals at bargain prices. While the Yankees have proven themselves recession-proof, small and mid-market teams are feeling the crunch.

Jason Giambi's one year, $5.25 million deal with Oakland and Pat Burrell's two year, $16 million deal with Tampa Bay should turn out to be excellent bargains in terms of offensive value for the money spent. Two productive sluggers like Giambi and Burrell wouldn't normally take significant pay cuts in free agency, but they were wise to recognize the tough situation most teams are in and chose to take a short-term, guaranteed paycheck instead of looking for a big contract that just wasn't there. These two contracts may have set the market for players like Bobby Abreu and Adam Dunn, neither of whom has found any offers to their liking. Dunn is rumored to be seeking a four year deal in the $50+ million range, but with Spring Training quickly approaching, a renewed awareness of defensive value around the league, and an apparent lack of serious suitors it seems doubtful that Dunn will get more than a fraction of that.

What does this mean for the Tribe in 2009? Not much. The team added nearly $19 million to their existing payroll and have already exceeded their planned budget for this season. Cleveland will not be making any more additions to the payroll unless a significant contract is moved first (which won't happen either). So even though there are several quality free agents available at steeply reduced prices, Cleveland will not be signing any of them. The question I'd like to answer is whether or not Cleveland should add one of these players. Would Adam Dunn be enough of an upgrade over Ben Francisco in left field to justify the additional money spent? First I'd like to look at what each player has to offer before moving on to a direct comparison.

Francisco on Offense

Year	PA	EqA	2B	HR	BB/K	OBP	SLG	wRAA
2007	66	.261	5	3	0.16	.303	.500	-.04
2008	447	.270	32	15	0.47	.332	.438	3.2

Ben Francisco had a solid overall season in 2008, slugging 32 doubles and 15 homers behind a .266 / .332 / .438 line. Unfortunately, a strong start was overshadowed by a miserable September where Francisco hit .188 with a season low .619 OPS in 81 PA. Francisco may have posted an .832 OPS before the All Star break, but that final month really drained the life out of what had been a strong rookie season. The late season slump also shook the club's confidence in Francisco, leaving him with something to prove heading into his second Major League season.

While the numbers suggest an average offensive performance in 2008 (OPS+ 100), Francisco was able to build upon the 66 PA he compiled in 2007. The last time Francisco faced ML pitching, he had only a 0.16 BB/K ratio and .303 OBP on a shaky .350 BABIP in 66 PA. Last season, Francisco elevated his BB/K ratio to 0.47 (his career BB/K in the minors is 0.56), had a .332 OBP, and saw his BABIP move to a more reliable .301. Ben also featured an improved plate discipline, becoming more selective in the types of pitches to attack. He swung at pitches outside the strike zone 8.4% less often and made contact with the ball in 81% of his at-bats. These are two excellent areas to see improvement for a developing hitter. Francisco had a better time recognizing which pitches to lay-off and was able to square up more often on hittable pitches.

Unlike David Dellucci, the team can pencil in the right-handed Francisco regardless of the opposing pitcher. Francisco had a .794 OPS against lefties and a .762 OPS against righties in 2008. Away from the Jake was a different story though, as Ben had a 109 point difference in his home and road OPS'. This is one aspect of Ben's game that will have to dramatically improve if he hopes to keep pace ahead of the prospects in Buffalo. Matt LaPorta and Michael Brantley will be challenging for Francisco's job from the start, so he really can't afford to go through a month-long slump like he has in the past. The good news, at least for Francisco, is that with Dellucci confined to the bench (or the waiver wire, mercifully) and the Tribe's Dynamic Duo still toiling in AAA he should have plenty of room to breathe at the start of the season. The bad news for Francisco is that Mark DeRosa is a more than adequate outfielder and may be asked to step in if Francisco struggles.

Regardless of whether benching Francisco for Jamey Carroll (who would take over at third with DeRosa in left) is the best move, it is definitely a move Wedge has been inclined to make in the past. Francisco will have some slack to work with, but the team does have other options if he stumbles at the plate. Given the sense of urgency displayed by Cleveland in retooling for 2008, it's clear the team knows how much is riding on this season. It's not like Cleveland has been exuding confidence in their outfield situation with the likes of Garko and Barfield under consideration for Spring Training reps beyond the diamond. An early summer call-up for one of their stud outfield prospects is not out of the question, even if it defers from the normal timetable given to such prospects.

I understand the argument against Francisco seeing any notable growth as a player because of his age; perfectly sound reasoning. At 26, he's not your typical sophomore and is probably near his ceiling as a player, if he isn't already there. I'm not expecting any major leaps in his game, but it's not unheard of for players with the right tools to break through at an advanced age if given the opportunity. Look at Casey Blake's career, he didn't even become a ML starter until age 29 and went on to post several solid seasons for the Tribe. Starting third baseman Mark DeRosa is another example of a player posting the best numbers of their career at a later age. We're not talking about a contract extension, just whether or not Ben's capable of holding down the fort until LaPorta and company arrive in 2009.

Ben did not put up any big numbers in his rookie season, but he was never expected to be a major offensive threat. Instead, he showed he still has the tools to succeed as a hitter in the Majors. Now that he has a full year of experience to go with a refined plate approach, Francisco may be poised for an even better campaign with the Tribe. If he can avoid the second-half slump he suffered in 2008, I think there is a strong chance Francisco will see at least modest gains at the plate.

Francisco on Defense

Year	Pos	Inn	PO	BIZ	Plays	RZR	OOZ (%PO)	UZR/150
2007	LF	102	26	21	17	.810	9 (34.6)	29.0
2008	LF	643	150	136	122	.897	28 (18.6)	-0.3

PO = putouts; BIZ = balls in zone; RZR = revised zone rating; OOZ = outside of zone; UZR/150 = ultimate zone rating adjusted for 150 games

Francisco more than pulled his weight in the outfield, displaying good range and a strong arm on defense. In terms of UZR/150 (that's ultimate zone rating adjusted for 150 games), Francisco was above average compared to most ML left fielders with at least 500 innings. His -0.3 mark (he basically broke even in terms of runs his defense cost the team) is significantly better than the next lowest player in Carlos Lee (-2.0), while most of the players with positive UZRs possess exceptional range (Francisco wouldn't be as far from the top if it weren't for transplants like Carl Crawford setting up shop in left). Somewhere well above Lee and on the periphery of the speedy outfielders sounds like a fair estimate of Francisco's range in left.

While he doesn't cover as much ground as some, Francisco does cast a fairly wide net in the field. Francisco's OOZ (out of zone, or the number of outs made by a fielder outside his normal defensive zone) shows that 18.6% of his total putouts were made beyond the expected defensive zone for a left fielder. This is a very respectable range, even though left field is a less demanding position than say, center field. Also, according to THT's Outfield Arms metric Francisco would have saved 3.1 runs over 200 opportunities through kills (throwing a runner out) and holds (preventing an eligible runner from advancing further). For comparison, I a rating around 1.0 run saved is par for the course, making Francisco above average in both range and arm strength.

Overall, Francisco is an asset on defense and has had no trouble holding down his position.

Dunn on Defense

Adam Dunn was one of the last free agents I would have expected to be available in February, yet there he is, unsigned. Now that General Managers are placing a higher premium on defense, statues like Dunn have seen their overall market value plummet. Why some team hasn't dropped a bag of cash in Dunn's lap to be their DH is beyond me though. I had read a while back that Dunn was insistent on continuing to play in the outfield (probably not a smart negotiating move), though he may have dropped this request since then. Plus, I fail to see how Dunn could turn down a multi-million dollar contract at this point just so he can continue to exercise his worst attribute as a ballplayer (props to Dunn for having the right attitude and not wanting to quit on defense, but it isn't terribly practical in this case). So even though moving to first base is a possibility (he has 97 career starts there) and would take some of the pressure off Dunn's lack of mobility, he wants no part of the infield on a full-time basis.

Did Dunn really do more harm than good by making all those starts in left field? Below are Dunn's defensive stats from the last three seasons:

Year	Pos	Inn	PO	BIZ	Plays	RZR	OOZ (%PO)	UZR/150
2006	LF	1321	279	270	237	.878	42 (15.0)	-11.0
2007	LF	1189	244	259	214	.826	31 (12.7)	-16.3
2008*	LF	915	191	179	161	.899	30 (15.7)	-13.5

*I only included Dunn's innings with Cincy in 2008 because it would have been tricky to calculate a combined value with Cincy and Arizona for each stat. The sample size for Arizona was small enough to not worry about anyway.

According to his UZR/150, Dunn cost his team 13.5 runs over 915 innings playing in left field. To give those -13.5 runs some perspective, among ML left fielders with at least 500 innings logged, only Chase Headley (that's a lot of ground to cover in Petco), Pat Burrell (now a DH), Jack Cust (kinda is a DH), Jason Bay (wasn't expecting him to be here), Delmon Young (first year in the Metrodome, should bounce back), and Luis Gonzalez (at 42 years old, I'll cut him some slack) were worse. There's no disputing that Dunn had a pretty rough time fielding his position in 2008. The same trend pops up in previous seasons as well (the annual variation shown is normal for defensive stats, he still hits double digits each year though). Also, who would have thought a guy as strong as Dunn would have a noodle-arm? Ok, that may not be a fair description, but he does struggle to keep runners in check. During his time in left field in 2008, Dunn's throwing actually cost his team 6.0 runs by itself.

Interestingly enough, Dunn's RZR (revised zone rating, or the proportion of balls hit into a fielder's zone that he successfully converts into an out) and OOZ are comparable to Francisco's. Francisco made a larger percentage of plays outside his defensive zone (18.6% to Dunn's 15.7%) but performed about the same as Dunn when fielding balls hit within the left field zone. This doesn't seem right at all. In fact, I can guarantee that in a fan poll, Francisco would display a better defensive reputation than Dunn.

Based purely on what I saw from Francisco last season, he's at the very least an average defender, while the stats cited earlier suggest he's above average in terms of runs saved. Meanwhile, Dunn's reputation certainly precedes him in terms of defensive deficiency. This is a good example of why empirical evidence is still way ahead of any current defensive metrics. It's cool to be able to quantify a player's range in terms of runs, but it's still a good idea to take those numbers with a grain of salt. Defensive stats are still being tweaked and refined by people much smarter than I.

Considering how many intricate variables go into the UZR formula (how hard a ball is hit, where it's hit, park factors, and the type of pitcher on the mound to name a few), it's not too surprising to see it produce a drastically different assessment compared to the revised zone ratings. Factor in a more reliable reputation for UZR and I think I'll stick with that in terms of quantifying each player's defensive value. Based on empirical evidence and the best available defensive stats, Ben Francisco is obviously a far superior defender to Adam Dunn.

Dunn on Offense

Year	PA	EqA	2B	HR	BB/K	OBP	SLG	wRAA
2006	683	.304	24	40	0.58	.365	.490	19.8
2007	632	.300	27	40	0.61	.386	.554	36.2
2008	651	.299	23	40	0.74	.386	.513	29.7

The consistency with which Dunn produces the same offensive numbers each year is almost comical. Seriously, who hits exactly 40 home runs for four straight seasons? Dunn specializes in hitting for power, drawing walks, and...that's basically it. The left-handed slugger has posted top five ML totals in both HR and BB in four of the past five seasons. Over eight Major League seasons, his career OBP is an outstanding .381 (sonnets have been written in tribute to Dunn's OBP). There's really not much to say about Dunn's bat that hasn't already been said. As far as launching taters and drawing walks, Dunn has been one of the best in baseball for several years running.

It may be foolish to wonder what the consequences of a Dunn power-outage would be since we're only discussing the short term. However, I'm curious just how big a factor the long ball is compared to all those walks in the context of Dunn's overall offense. If for some reason (a new ballpark, adjusting to a new league, or plain bad luck for example) Dunn sees a decline in his home run ability, how much of his value would he retain? Dunn does not possess much speed and has never been much of a doubles hitter, despite a consistently strong slugging percentage (obviously his SLG is supported mostly by homers). In 2008, his 23 doubles did not even crack the top 150 among all ML players. Excluding home runs, Dunn has never collected many extra base hits and has only two seasons (2004, 2005) with more than 30 doubles and at least 500 at-bats.

One way to determine how heavy Dunn's homers are within his overall offensive value is to consider equivalent average (EqA). EqA (set to the same scale as batting average, where .260 is the league average) is a good bet for evaluating pure offensive production in this case since it does not give homers a weighted advantage like OPS and its refined cousin, wOBA. Looking at the formula for raw EqA, (H + TB + 1.5*(BB + HBP + SB) + SH + SF) divided by (AB + BB + HBP + SH + SF + CS + SB) you can see that hits, total bases, walks, and stolen bases are among the most significant variables.

The fact that Dunn lacks much speed on the bases, plays in a hitter-friendly ballpark, and has a dearth of hits would have seriously dragged on Dunn's offensive numbers if it weren't for his ability to advance via base on balls. Dunn had about a .300 EqA the past two seasons, meaning he was a very valuable hitter despite the several factors working against him. As it turns out, all those walks would still carry the day in the event Dunn falls short of his annual 40 homer mark. Even though he's had a top five strikeout total every season of his career, Dunn still possesses the plate discipline to lay off pitches outside the zone and work the count. Dunn can get away with batting .236 since he reaches base nearly 40% of the time, regardless (you can criticize a player like Dunn all you want, just please don't base your argument on batting average).

Amazingly, Dunn only swung at pitches outside the zone 17.2% of the time in 2008 (this is quite good). On the other hand, he made contact with just 71.8% of the pitches he offered at last season. This is a pretty poor contact rate although it is in line with other sluggers like Thome and Howard who have a tendency to swing for the fences (unlike Dunn, they swing at balls outside the zone a lot more). Finally, pitchers showed a healthy respect for Dunn's power by throwing him a strike just 45.5% of the time. Dunn is in good company as far as striking fear in the hearts of scrub pitchers; only Josh Hamilton, Prince Fielder, and Vlad Guerrero (a notorious free-swinger) saw fewer pitches in the strike zone in 2008.

These trends highlight Dunn's all-or-nothing approach at the plate. While he is very good at identifying pitches not to hit (those outside the strike zone), his swing appears to have some major holes in it. Like the aforementioned Thome and Howard, Dunn usually attacks with a big power stroke to drive the ball as far as possible. This type of long, loaded swing will produce a lot of hard fly balls, but it also leaves the hitter vulnerable and unable to protect the plate as well as hitters with more compact swings who tend to focus on just making solid contact most of the time (singles and doubles). Dunn's approach is on the extreme end for power hitters, resulting in maximum power and minimal precision.

While some may argue otherwise, I don't see Dunn's approach as an issue. The majority of hitters are forced to make the tradeoff between crushing the ball or slapping a single when they come up to the plate anyway. Only a few elite players can consistently produce a true balance in their offensive attack (like Manny and Pujols). In other words, don't expect a guy who hits 40 homers to bat .300 in the same season. Both are valuable in their own way, but you can't expect to have the best of both worlds.

One could argue that Dunn needs the intimidation factor associated with those punishing home runs to maintain his high walk rate. Pitchers are obviously reluctant to throw strikes out of fear he will launch one into the bleachers. This theory is more relevant to a long term projection though, since the the 28-year old Dunn won't be experiencing a physical decline in power anytime soon. It would take a serious drop in power potential before pitchers decided to regularly challenge Dunn within the strike zone. Therefore, Dunn's walk rate won't be going away anytime soon. If he were to experience a decline in homers, this would still impact the bottom line for the team that signs him, bringing us back to the earlier question (sorry, I got a little off track).

What would happen once Dunn moved out of Cincinnati's home ballpark for the first time in his career? Dunn's numbers had to have benefited from all those seasons playing in a hitter friendly ballpark. According to ESPN, Great American Ballpark in Cincinnati had a 1.069 park factor in 2008, making it the seventh most hitter-friendly park in the Majors. Chase Field in Arizona, Dunn's post-trade home park, had the second highest factor at 1.135, possibly explaining why his performance did not suffer from the change in venue last season.

If Dunn were to spend half of his at-bats in Cleveland, there is a strong possibility he would experience some adverse effects. Progressive Field had a .995 overall park factor, but really suppressed home runs. Out of 30 ballparks, Cleveland had a HR park factor of .824; third lowest in the Majors (only Kaufmann Stadium and Petco Park saw fewer taters, in addition to having lower overall park factors than Progressive Field). Even if it's only a minor consideration, Dunn's performance will likely reflect his new home to some degree.

Wins and Salary

For me, the choice between Francisco and Dunn is contingent on the gap between Francisco's defensive value and Dunn's offensive value. As an above-average defender boasting at least an average bat, I expected Francisco to match up favorably to Dunn, whose atrocious defense cancels out quite a bit of his advantage on offense. To quantify these two factors I used FanGraphs' spiffy value wins table, replicated below.

Francisco FanGraphs Value Wins Table

Year	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Value Runs	Value Wins	Dollars
2007	-0.3	2.4	2.2	-1.3	3.0	0.3	$1.2
2008	3.7	-4.3	16.6	-6.3	9.7	1.0	$4.3

Dunn FanGraphs Value Wins Table

Year	Batting	Fielding	Replacement	Positional	Value Runs	Value Wins	Dollars
2006	17.9	-12.4	22.8	-7.5	20.7	2.0	$7.4
2007	34.5	-14.9	21.1	-7.2	33.4	3.3	$13.3
2008	27.4	-22.8	21.7	-8.0	18.3	1.8	$8.2

For a detailed overview of how these numbers were calculated, click here and scroll down. The values most relevant to this analysis are Batting, Fielding, and Value Wins. Batting depicts the player's wRAA (offensive runs above average, this time adjusted for the home ballpark and league) while fielding is total UZR (both values were included in the player tables earlier). The Position adjustment accounts for the degree of difficulty for a player's defensive position. For example, left field is a much less demanding position to field than shortstop, so left fielders have a -7.5 run penalty compared to the +7.5 run bonus a shortstop receives (this stems from the idea that a player who can hit at a high level and field an elite defensive position is that much more valuable). The Replacement value addresses the monetary value of wins and a player's time on the field, as opposed to a lesser bench player (the concept of replacement level and calculating salaries can get complicated quick, so I'll let FanGraphs do the talking if you're so inclined).

Assuming positive values are good and negative values are bad for a player's value, the final formula plays out as basic math: wRAA + UZR + Position + Replacement = Value Runs.

As expected, Dunn's superior batting value is largely canceled out by his negative fielding value, producing 18.3 runs above replacement for the 2008 season. FanGraphs makes the run total easier to interpret by converting it into wins using a team's Pythagorean value (calculates a team's expected win-loss record based on its runs scored/against rate). Assuming roughly 10 runs equals 1 win, Dunn was responsible for 1.8 wins during his time with Cincinnati and Arizona.

For Francisco, his batting and fielding values are nearly a wash. I only cited Francisco's innings in LF earlier, while the UZR value shown here depicts his time at every position. Since Francisco was not as strong defensively at the other outfield positions, his fielding value takes a hit (this also results in a lower positional penalty than an exclusive left fielder). Francisco produced 9.7 runs above replacement overall, which translated into 1.0 win for the Tribe in 2008.

Note the difference in innings (288) and plate appearances (152) between Francisco and Dunn. This gives Dunn an advantage in terms of total wins (more chances to contribute results in more partial wins credited). As it stands, Francisco has about a 25% deficit to Dunn in total chances (innings + PA) which roughly equals .25 wins that Francisco never had the opportunity to earn. According to the numbers, Dunn was worth just half a win more (.55) than Francisco in 2008. That's a surprisingly slim difference considering the gap in experience and salary between the two outfielders. To be fair, Dunn did produce 3.3 wins in 2007 and saw his 2008 fielding runs suffer slightly from 128 innings at first base (-12.5 positional penalty), so unless Francisco takes a step forward offensively (or Dunn loses a step defensively) that .55 win difference has plenty of potential to grow.

Finally, assuming each win cost a team about $4.5 million in 2008, Dunn's calculated monetary value was $8.2 million while his actual salary was $13 million. Francisco holds a major advantage in this department and posted a sizable surplus in terms of his calculated value of $4.3 million and actual salary (close to the league minimum of $390,000 due to his brief service time).

I don't view Adam Dunn as enough of an upgrade to justify the money he's demanding (whether or not he gets anything resembling $12.5 million a year is another story). Whoever signs him is probably going to end up losing a few million dollars in undelivered value, although that team will hopefully be filling a dire need. Cleveland, on the other hand, does not have a legitimate need in left field due to their envious outfield depth in the high minors and flexibility within the Major League club. If Cleveland were to sign Dunn, they'd be paying a premium for an extra win, maybe two, in the form of a crowded roster, a downgraded defense, and even less financial flexibility than they had before (namely, none).

The fine line between Francisco and Dunn's overall value for 2008 showed that Cleveland would only be making an incremental upgrade for what amounts to a luxury. Dunn would have to go absolutely nuts at the plate to even begin to justify his atrocious defense and expected salary. Since there's no way Dunn is going to match his career year from 2004, his true offensive value will continue to be negated to the point of being a waste. So much of his overall value dies on the field it's like watching money get flushed down a toilet. I don't want to diminish Dunn's offensive prowess, but he really is costing himself potential salary by refusing to become a DH. At this point the market seems to have cooled so much I don't think even a concession to DH full time could salvage this winter for Dunn and his agent.

Which brings us to yet another issue with Dunn. Without a DH vacancy, there is no way for Cleveland to capitalize on Dunn's greatest asset, not to mention how idiotic it would be to have $24 million wrapped up in dual designated hitters. They were far better off spending that extra $12 million on filling holes at closer and third base (big difference between filling an actual hole and merely upgrading a position; we didn't have a real closer or third baseman until recently) rather than giving it to a free agent outfielder. Dunn is a few tools short of the full set and should not be grouped with or paid like the games truly elite players.

Cleveland absolutely made the right move in going with an inexpensive, low risk, high reward youth movement in left and watching their wisely spent funds (a.k.a. Wood and DeRosa) produce dividends elsewhere on the roster.

UZR, Value Wins formula, and associated stats taken from FanGraphs.

Outfield Arm ratings, RZR, and OOZ taken from The Hardball Times.

EqA taken from Baseball Prospectus.